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peer review, the main text should not contain the name of the author, nor
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acknowledgments. Authors will receive reviewers’ reports within two or three
months after submissions. If the reports are favorable, contributors will be given
three months to submit a revised copy of their manuscripts. Contributors will have
the opportunity to review copyedited and page proofs copies of their manuscripts
before publication.
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• click on “Submit Article” on JORA homepage at
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• upload your manuscripts.
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your submissions.
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EDITOR’S PREFACE
We are pleased to announce the inaugural issue of Journal of Retracing Africa
(JORA). For centuries, Africa’s socioeconomic and political development has been
dictated by a dynamic and complex coalescence of external and domestic forces.
Narratives on Africa abound. Many, unfortunately, hold myths, misconceptions,
and misrepresentations of issues and events surrounding the continent. The
launching of JORA is an attempt to oﬀer a thoughtful and balanced reconstruction
of African societies, histories, and cultures. By providing a platform for scholars to
provide their unique perspectives on all aspects of the African experience, JORA
makes a valuable contribution towards producing an account about Africa that is
more accurate, comprehensive, and reliable.
In this issue, Victor Olumide Ekanade examines the problems and challenges
of Africa’s economic development in a globalizing world. Probing the influence
of external financial institutions on Africa’s economic policies and focusing on
Nigeria’s consequential economic experiments since the 1980s, he shows how
“Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal economic policy largely
undermined the country’s quest for a sustainable economic development.”1 As
the author shows in the article, the implementation of a neoliberal agenda has
“encouraged capital flight, authoritarianism, corruption, [and] the mushrooming
of the informal sector.” To address these problems, the author insists that the
federal government “must practice home-grown development policies that fulfil
the developmental aspirations of the masses.”2
Any discussion of the various victims of the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970,
is incomplete without analyzing the experiences of minorities within Biafra: Efik,
Ijaw, Ogoja, and Ibibio. During the war, as Arua Oko Omaka reminds us, these
ethnic groups faced “layers of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority
and the Biafran government” which caused them to experience “a high degree of
persecution, molestation, injustice, [and] psychological torture.”3 Through careful
analysis of oral and written evidence on the war, the author shows how the need
to establish control over “the oil-rich region” not only made the conflict to assume
an international dimension, but also exposed minorities “to more dangers and
destruction.” He argues that identifying these ethnic groups “as victims would
place them in their rightful position in the nation’s history.”4

1
Victor Olumide Ekanade, “The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in Nigeria Since the
1980s,”Journal of Retracing Africa 1, Issue 1 (2014): 1.
2
Ibid., 27.
3
Arua Oko Omaka, “The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War,
1967-1970,” Journal of Retracing Africa 1, Issue 1 (2014): 1.
4
Ibid., 45.
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The two articles oﬀered in this issue, coupled with nine book reviews, will
undoubtedly engage our thinking about how global forces have intermingled
with domestic elements to shape the political and economic landscape in Africa
in the colonial and postcolonial era. You are encouraged to submit your best
research papers to JORA. JORA is a no-fee, peer-reviewed, open access journal,
and authors will enjoy wide readership from publishing in the journal. Open to
diﬀerent but rigorous research methodologies—and insisting on manuscripts
that make original and compelling contribution to knowledge—JORA welcomes
submissions focusing on African studies since the precolonial period.
This publication was made possible because of the dedication of JORA’s
managing editor, copy-editor, book review editors, members of the editorial
board, the editorial assistant, authors, external reviewers, BePress, Eastern
Kentucky University Libraries, Oﬃce of the Dean, University Programs, and the
African & African-American Studies program at Eastern Kentucky University. We
thank you. We will continue to count on you in what promises to be many more
successful years of JORA.
Ogechi E. Anyanwu
Editor-in-Chief.
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The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in
Nigeria Since the 1980s
Victor Olumide Ekanade
Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Abstract: Over the last 30 years, the logic of market liberalization has
increasingly permeated the social and economic facets of political and
economic discourse to such an extent that the core values about the
responsibilities and obligations of nation-states to their citizens have
been strained. The welfarist ethos featuring in the public finance of some
European and North American countries for much of the twentieth
century included values such as equity and access, which manifested
in the subsidization and aﬀordability of social amenities. The welfarist
concept, premised on the experience of western European economies,
was based on the logic that if a large proportion of the population could
not aﬀord clean water, health care, or education for their children,
long-term corporate interests of the society would be undermined.
State-subsidized provision of these essentials was thus fully embraced
because of the understanding of the short and long-term public interest
involved. However, by the 1980s, changes in international markets
fostered a precipitous decline in African economies. Many governments
thus jettisoned its state-centered economic strategy since it could no
longer fund public expenditure on sustainable basis. Nowhere was the
shift in economic policy more pronounced as in Nigeria. The drastic
decline in national revenue due to a dip in international price of oil
led to Nigeria’s balance of payment deficit making the introduction of
forced neoliberal economic policy inevitable. Analyzing the dynamics
of policy formulation and implementation since the 1980s, this article
argues that Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal
economic policy largely undermined the country’s quest for a
sustainable economic development.
Keywords: Nigeria; Neoliberalism; Social Welfare; Democracy; Poverty;
Military Regimes; Economic Reforms; Privatization; Corruption.

Introduction
Nigeria’s experience with neoliberal economic policy presents a classic example
of a state which progressively shifted from a relative welfare state to ad-hoc
welfarist state and full blown free market economy. The implementation of
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the country between 1986 and early
1990s, in addition to neoliberal policies under civil regimes from 1999 until the
present, have had colossal implications for Nigeria’s national development. In
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this neoliberal context, democracy was re-established to satisfy market demands
without adequate regard to social needs. Neoliberal reforms were not concerned
with social issues but with market eﬃciency, which worked against the basic
tenets of human rights and constitutional safeguards for Nigerian citizens. Forced
neoliberalism is state policy foisted on the people in a democracy without their
due consent. This practice is typical of politics in post-colonial Africa.
Neoliberal economic policies and profound internal socio-political
convulsions are challenging African states, including Nigeria. Even though they
are acknowledged as independent states within the global community, African
countries have not adequately established themselves as nations with national
identities. They also have not conquered the challenges of good governance and
gained their economic autonomy. The post-Westphalian states of Europe treat
African states as dependent associates, providing them with financial aid through
international agencies such as the Bretton Woods institutions.1 Nigeria for instance
is a subordinate unit responsive to the policies of international organizations, and
subject to the imposition of their programs such as the World Bank’s SAPs based
on neoliberal principles.2 The SAP instituted in Nigeria in 1986 under General
Ibrahim Babangida proved dreadful in terms of implementation and outcomes as
it led to a drop in the standard of living of the majority of Nigerians as subsidies
on essential commodities and services were removed, provoking a series of
devastating riots. Furthermore, the outcomes of neoliberal policies established
with the return of democratic regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, between 1999
and 2007, were also disappointing. As a democratic regime, it was expected that
the Obasanjo government would create conditions aimed at reducing poverty
and inequality. Rather the established democracy abided with market standards
without due consideration for the needs of the citizenry. This article examines
the contradiction of the institutionalization of democracy in Nigeria as a moral
value while at the same time negating the social rights of its citizens. It argues
that the growth of electoral democracy occurred at the same time of heightened
social problems in the country, and shows how neoliberalism since 1999 worsened
the plight of a large segment of the Nigerian population, deepening poverty,
inequality, unemployment, and social exclusion.

1

George Clement Bond, “Globalization, Neoliberalism, Historical Conditionalities,” The
Journal of African American History 88, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 330. Peter Lewis, “From
Prebendalsim to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 34 no.1 (Mar, 1996), 81.
2
Babawale Tunde and Onuoha Browne, “The State Corruption and the Challenges of Good
Governance,” in Rich but Poor, Corruption and Good governance in Nigeria, ed. Lai Olurode
and Remi Anifowoshe (Lagos: University of Lagos, 2005), 64.
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Conceptual Framework
The received wisdom in literature on neoliberalism in Africa and Latin America as
posited by Graham Harrison, George Clement Bond, Margaret Hanson and James
Hentz, Adebayo Olukoshi, Chibuzo Nwoke, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova is that
the failure of leadership in these continents and the need to revamp their distressed
economies necessitated the introduction of neoliberal policies in the polities.3
This amounts to a misreading of these societies, especially African states where
neoliberalism is fundamentally in disharmony with African communal ways of
life but finds relevance in the socialist mode of production. Another consensus in
literature is that structural adjustment and neoliberal policies imposed on Africa
and Latin America all carry a specific political and economic principle that is
decisively anti-people- anti working class but pro-private capital. One of the many
tragedies of neoliberalism is that in its bid to promote the forces of the market and
long term interests of the private capitalist class, systematic assaults have been
launched on the African and Latin American states’ welfare, social, and public
expenditure programs, which have in turn resulted in backlash. Thus it cannot
be assumed that developmental needs of the state and citizenry will be served by
simply turning to the market. The body of literature mentioned above does not
however explain how neoliberalism interacted with the democratization process,
corruption, and constitutional provisions in these states. This is a gap this article
will attempt to fill in, using the context of the Nigerian state.
According to Adejumobi Said, historically the provision of social welfare
services has been a state responsibility in both developed and developing
countries. However the introduction of privatization, which was meant to help
curtail government expenditure, creates new social problems or exacerbates
existing ones which would require supplementary public spending in order
to contain them.4 For Jarret Alfred5 and Claude Ake,6 colonialism left behind a
legacy of a social welfare system irrelevant to the social needs of the masses in
Nigeria, as it was structured for profit maximization and essentially designed to
3
Graham Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society;
the Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no, 8 (2005): 1303-1320;
Bond; Margaret Hanson and James Hentz, “Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South
Africa and Zambia,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (1999): 479-502; Olukoshi Adebayo
and Chibuzo. N. Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment Programmes” in Structural Adjustment in West Africa, eds. Olukoshi Adebayo,
Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi Aribisala (Lagos: NIIA, 1994), 11-27.
4
Adejumobi Said, “Privatisation Policy and the Delivery of Social Welfare Services in
Africa: A Nigerian Example,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 14, no. 2 (1999): 87-108.
5
Alfred A. Jarrett, “Problems and Prospects of the Social Welfare Systems of Sierra Leone
and Nigeria,” International Social Work 34, no. 2 (April, 1991): 143-157.
6
Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (New York: Longman, 1981).
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meet not the needs of the colony but those of the colonial masters. Thus it did not
encourage investment in social welfare schemes for the African population. After
independence, Nigeria inherited the outdated social welfare system left behind
by the colonial order. This had serious implications for structural adaptation, cost
eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness of these public corporations in terms of delivery of
welfare services since most of the public corporations were centrally controlled.
For Arowosegbe Jeremiah, the inherent character of the “imported state,” oriented
exclusively towards maintenance of law and order, explains the overdeveloped
status of the state’s apparatuses of violence, which was a tool for maximizing
colonial exploitation, relative to its educational, health, and other welfare systems.
Local elites under successive regimes in Nigeria have not innovatively engaged
with reinventing the state but have continued along the same trajectory. 7

Historical Background of Neo-liberalism
Neoliberalism is rooted in the classical liberal ideas of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo. Both viewed the market as a self-regulating mechanism tending towards
equilibrium of supply and demand, thus securing the most eﬃcient allocation
of resources. These British economists and philosophers considered that any
constraint on free competition would interfere with the natural eﬃciency of market
mechanisms, inevitably leading to social stagnation, political corruption, and the
creation of unresponsive state bureaucracies.8 In modern times, neoliberalism
emerged as a synonym for the mainly externally directed attempt to remove the
state from the economy. The World Bank’s Berg Report claimed that many of
Africa’s economic problems emanated from excessive ineﬃcient state intervention
in the economy.9
Neoliberalism is steeped in a system of economic, social, and political
ideals that are rightwing versions of the modern post-enlightenment themes of
rationality, democracy, and individual freedom. Neoclassical economics rethought
these eighteenth and nineteenth century principles of economic modernism and
for a while reluctantly abandoned pure market determination for limited state
regulation during the Keynesian interlude of post-war period. During the 1970’s
when widespread problems of stagflation were deemed beyond the reach of
Keynesian fiscal policy, nineteenth century liberalism was revived as a rightwing

7

Jeremiah Arowosegbe, “Claude Ake: Political Integration and the Challenges of
Nationhood in Africa,” Development and Change 42, no. 1 (January, 2011): 349-365.
8
Steger Manfred, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003).
9
Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1303-1304.
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version of neoliberalism.10
Neoliberalism now emerged as monetarism in the 1970s, a reflection of the
triumph in the west of the monetarist shade of neo-classical economics, which
was against Keynesianism and all it stood for. Monetarism is essentially about
ascendency of the market and “peripheralization” of the state, which in the
monetarists’ view had become too large, unfit and ineﬃcient, and excessively
interventionist. As part of the eﬀort to reduce the size and role of the state, they
called for the withdrawal of a host of subsidies that were introduced at the height
of the Keynesian revolution, the elimination of subventions to public enterprises
and privatization of those enterprises.11
The globalization of the monetarist agenda was skillfully assisted with the
coming to power in the early 1980s of conservative governments dedicated to the
cause of monetarism in the leading western countries that dominate the world
capitalist economy. The most prominent of these governments were those of
Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the United States, Helmut Kohl in
West Germany, and later Brian Mulroney in Canada.12 They all dismantled their
welfare states in response to the global economic crisis of the 1970’s, the rising costs
of labor in Europe and USA, and the rapid development of capitalism in newly
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia that led to increased competition, reduced
profit rate, and the crises of overproduction. The resultant eﬀect of the emergence
of these rightwing governments, unrepentant in the pursuit of monetarism, was
the reorientation of the dominant outlook within the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank. These two key institutions shed their Keynesian toga and
embraced monetarist principles.13
The outcome of this reorientation in the IMF and World Bank had fundamental
and colossal consequences for developing countries. By 1983/1984, the African
debt crisis was serious as debt servicing alone consumed about a third of all their
foreign receipts and moved them into severe depression.14 Thus, the World Bank
and IMF were able to use the debt crisis in Africa to gain substantial leverage over
10
Elaine Hartwick and Richard Peet, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: Neoliberalism
and Nature: The case of the WTO,” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science
590 (November, 2003): 188-211.
11
Adebayo and Chibuzo, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment Programmes,” 14.
12
Rick Rowden, “An Overview of the Increased Coordination of the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank and World Trade, Trade Liberalization Policies,” 2nd draft working paper,
Washington DC, October, 2009.
13
Adebayo and Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment programme,”14-15.
14
Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 24.
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economic policies in Africa which hitherto was limited. In their attempt to come
to terms with the crisis of their local economies, developing countries approached
the World Bank and IMF for financial aid, giving the United States the chance to
sell them the Brady Plan.15 Western countries that dominate these financial bodies
such as the United States not only ensured that the two institutions fell in line with
their new economic thinking but also encouraged them to make the acceptance
and implementation of market reforms a pre-condition for financial assistance
to debtor nations.16 Given the comatose state of most post-colonial third world
economies, they embraced the new policies and conditions. The 1980s was the era
of monetarists’ domination of economic policies in the third world. The IMF and
the World Bank eﬀectively imposed their policies of SAP as a panacea of economic
transformation throughout developing countries, including Nigeria.

Nigeria’s Experience with Structural Adjustment
As a major oil-producing nation, Nigeria enjoyed almost a decade of unprecedented
revenue boom arising from the petroleum price increases of the 1970’s. One
remarkable characteristic of Nigeria’s expenditure during this period was its
“welfarist” orientation with government domestic investments and concentrated
provision of a massive transport system, road networks, public buildings, and
health infrastructure. Employment rates soared, coupled with increases in
subsidies on food, transport, health, fuel, and education.17 The Shehu Shagari
regime (1979-1983) systematized the subsidized sale and distribution of specific
commodities known as essential commodities to Nigerians. These included
rice, milk, beef, sugar, among other items. These products were imported by the
Nigerian government through the Nigerian National Supply Company and sold
to Nigerians at rates below prevailing market prices. These subsidies remained
all through the Shagari era but terminated with the introduction of SAPs in
1986, which led to the removal of subsidies, reduction of public expenditures,
15
John T. Rourke, International Politics on World Stage (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2000),
467- 468. The Brady Plan emphasized that bank creditors should grant debt relief to debtor
states in exchange for greater assurance of collectability in the form of principal and
interest collateral. Also, debt relief for debtor states needed to be linked to some assurance
of economic reform and the resulting debt should be highly tradeable to allow creditors
to diversify risk more widely throughout the financial and investment community.
See EMTA, “The Brady Plan,” accessed April 22, 2013, http://www.emta.org/template.
aspx?id=35&terms=brady+plan.
16
David .K. Leonard and Scott Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes
and Cures (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), 25-26. See also Elmar Alvater,
“Postneoliberalism or Postcapitalism? The Failure of Neoliberalism in the Financial Market
Crisis,” Development Dialogue Uppsala no. 51 (January, 2009): 73-88.
17
Thandika Mkandawire, “Fiscal Structure, State Contraction and Political Responses from
Africa,” in Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa,
eds. Mkandiawire Thandika and Olukoshi Adebayo (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 37.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Ekanade | 7
privatization, and devaluation of domestic currency.18
Part of the reason for the introduction of SAPs was the economic decline that
started in the early 1980s. The international source of the crisis was the dramatic
flagging of the oil markets in the first half of the 1980s, which made the country’s
financial position deteriorate. Export revenues plunged by 53 percent between
1980 and 1982, from US$27.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.19 At the same time, the
value of internal public debt increased by 72 percent from US$8.5 billion in 1979
to $26.9 billion in 1983 while external debt was estimated at $14.13 billion during
this period.20 As commitments accumulated, short-term borrowing increased, and
interest rates escalated. On the domestic scene, the downturn was accentuated by
the monocultural nature of the economy, the character of the politicians during the
return of the civilian governments in the early 1908s, who were flippant with federal
funds, and the endemic corruption of the same class and gross mismanagement of
the national treasury. The crisis raised questions of sustainability of state subsidy
as social services suﬀered due to underfunding. The industrial sector shut down 50
percent of its firms and thousands of its workers were laid oﬀ.21 These multifaceted
crises provided the immediate domestic context for the adoption by the Nigerian
state of an orthodox program of structural adjustment sponsored by the Bretton
Woods institutions.22
The first serious attempt to examine the role of the state in the Nigerian
economy came in 1981 when the Shehu Shagari regime appointed a presidential
commission of inquiry to examine the parastatals. The commission’s report
recommended an increased role for the private sector in administering the partially
government-owned organizations. This recommendation was to cut government
expenditure at the expense of the masses. In the context of the debt problems, the
Shagari administration in April 1982 introduced the Economic Stabilization Act to
control imports, introduce more discipline into the monetary system, and narrow
the gap between public expenditure and income through cuts in government
18

Ikubolajeh, Logan and Kidane Mengisteab, “Introduction,” in Beyond Economic
Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustments and Alternatives, eds. Kidane Mengisteab and
Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed, 1995), 3.
19
Lewis Peter, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly
Performing States, eds. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington
D.C: Center for Global Development 2006), 83-116.
20
James Guseh and Emmanuel Oritsejafor, “Government Size, Political Freedom and
Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1960-2000,” Journal of Third World Studies xxiv, no 1 ( 2007):
142.
21
Olukoshi Adebayo, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” in Between
Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa, eds. P. Thandika
Mkandiawire and Adebayo Olukoshi (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 163-164.
22
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expenditure.23 The stabilization program failed because the regime was reluctant
to remove subsidies and commercialize public enterprises. Many stalwarts of the
ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) owed their enormous wealth to their direct
control over the parastatals, marketing of rice, fertilizer, and petroleum products.24
Consequently, the Shagari government approached the IMF for an extended fund
facility of between N1.9 and N2.4 billion. The IMF insisted on certain conditions
including privatization, a curb on government spending, trade liberalization,
and introduction of sales tax. 25 No concrete agreement was reached with the IMF
before the government was overthrown on December 31, 1983. 26
The successive regime of Muhammadu Buhari agreed with the IMF on
the need for fundamental reforms in the Nigerian economy but was unwilling
to accept part of the IMF’s recommendations such as currency devaluation,
privatization, liberalization of trade, and withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy.
It nevertheless embraced the policy of commercialization but insisted on state
regulations. This resulted in a stalemate and the outcome was the tightening of
the boycott of Nigeria by western banks and export credit guarantee agencies. The
leading financial institutions insisted that the government had to obtain a clean
bill of health from the IMF before the country’s debt, put at about $20 billion in
1984, could be rescheduled and fresh capital injections authorized.27 The second
approach adopted by Buhari’s government, in its bid to mitigate the eﬀects of
the disparate pressing demands by the IMF and Nigerians on the economy, was
the introduction of the policy of counter trade, a modern day variant of trade by
barter, with Brazil and some West European states. The scale of the counter trade
deals was however too small and costly relative to the magnitude of the country’s
economic problems28 Thus, the regime introduced a comprehensive package of
austerity measures as part of its own stabilization eﬀorts with severe restriction
23
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Problems” in Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (Lagos:
Malthouse,1990), 31.
24
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Management under the Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy no. 34
(1985): 95-96.
25
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Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2006), 20.
26
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Heinemann, 1993), 17-18.
27
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Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State,” in
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28
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on imports. This made it diﬃcult for local industries to procure essential imported
raw materials forcing many of them to close shop. Subsequently, many workers
were laid oﬀ, and the government itself retrenched many employees to increase its
“cost eﬀectiveness.” All of these actions were accompanied by high inflation. The
price of basic food items rose, and life became increasingly diﬃcult for the masses
and even the aﬄuent.29
Adequate health care is critical for the worker to maintain his productivity
while education is important in order to improve the quality of that productivity.
Cost recovery measures introduced in health and education sectors by the Buhari
regime had a reverberating impact on the citizenry. The Nigerian constitution
stipulates that federal, state, and local governments should fund, in a coordinated
manner, a three-tier system of health care. However, total health expenditure
in real terms declined sharply from a total of N825.5 million in 1980 to N128.3
million in 1984 representing a fall of about eighty-five percent. The negative
impact of this manifested in the increase of the under five-year-old mortality
rate which moved from 181.1 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 192.4 per 1,000 live
births in 1985.30 The illness rate in rural areas also approached 100 per thousand,
particularly among children and the aged people in the 1983-1984 period. The
education sector also worsened and with it came employees’ inability to benefit
from educational policy31. The total number of secondary schools in the country
fell from 38,211 in 1984 to 35,281 in 1985. In addition, the government imposed
heavy levies, indiscriminately on parents of school children. At the tertiary level,
the government withdrew the feeding program of students, thus increasing the
cost for students and their parents32 Buhari’s legitimacy was soon dissipated by
his authoritarian nature and he was deposed by General Ibrahim Babangida in

29
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L.A Amaghionyeodiwe, “Fiscal Federalism, Health Care Spending and National
Development: The Nigerian Experience,” in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic
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and Health Survey, 1990.
31
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Nigeria, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli (Dakar: Codesria, 1993), 142.
32
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August, 1985.
In 1985, Nigeria was still reeling under a heavy debt burden with declining
oil revenues, and Babangida opened a national debate on whether Nigeria should
take the IMF loan or not and the role the government should play in managing the
economic crisis. The premeditated decision of the regime prevailed as Babangida,
despite the people’s protests, adopted a supposedly homegrown adjustment
program akin to the IMF prescriptions. It was obvious that the debate was a
smokescreen because Babangida had earlier appointed Chief Olu Falae, a pro-IMF
personality as the nation’s finance minister and Babangida himself had insisted on
the necessity to adjust the naira to its ‘realistic’ value.33 This was the SAP, which
Babangida claimed would halt economic stagnation and revitalize growth. The SAP
was a package of neoliberal economic reforms, primarily aimed at strengthening
market forces and retrenching the state. This had dire consequences for the Nigerian
political economy and its peoples, state, agriculture, and industry.34 For instance,
the public sector carried out its program of retrenchment through sackings and
various other means. One of these was to disband existing public enterprises such
as the Nigerian National Supply Company and the various commodity boards.
Another was to merge enterprises. Reorganization in corporations such as Nigeria
Railway Corporation, Nigeria Airways, and Nigeria Airport Authorities led to the
retrenchment of 8,000, 2,500, and 2,000 workers respectively in 1988. In same year,
1988, 32,000 workers in the textile industry were retrenched as spasmodic and
eventual permanent closure of industries ensued.35
Faced with ever declining standards of living and without resources that
formerly co-opted oppositions and nurtured clients, the state under General
Babangida increasingly relied on coercion to implement structural adjustment
plans.36 General Babangida sought to assuage popular opposition to adjustment
through selective provisioning of certain welfare facilities through institutions such
as Directorate for food, roads, and rural infrastructure (DFRRI) to provide special
assistance to rural areas, networks of Peopleand Community Banks to extend
credit to small scale and local borrowers. The Better Life Programme sponsored
by the First Lady was also intended to promote the production of craft works
33
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34
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Nigeria. ed. Attahiru Jega, (Uppsala: Nordiska African Institute and Centre for Research
and Documentation, 2003), 31-33.
35
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36
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among the poor, especially women. These initiatives were mostly underfunded,
ephemeral, or suﬀused with corruption, and their impact on popular welfare was
questionable.37
Education was consistently underfunded at less than 6 percent of total
expenditure of the sector during this regime. In previous years though, especially
between 1978 and 1982 the federal government spent more than 6 percent of total
expenditure on the educational sector. However, in 1992, the federal government
spent less than 1 percent of its total expenditure on the sector.38 This had severe
repercussions for infrastructure, teaching, and research activities, and on the
quality of students produced. It aﬀected the morale of teachers who were owed
arrears of salaries for several months and who had to abandon their duties out
of necessity to seek other means of sustenance.39 Healthcare equally suﬀered due
to the withdrawal of subsidy from that sector under Babangida. Infant mortality
increased from 87.2 per 1,000 live births in 1985 to 191 per 100 live births in 1993
as access to safe water also diminished from 45 per 1,000 in 1985 to 40 per 1,000 in
1993 when he stepped aside. By 1991, debt servicing ate up 47 percent of the overall
federal budget and remained so in 1992 and 1993. By 1993, the deficit Babangida
accumulated was put at N90-N100 billion. The annual budget for that year was
N120 billion. One is left to wonder how a country that was adjusting could aﬀord to
amass huge deficit year after year, especially after 1989.40 Thus, the SAP rather than
helping to revamp the economy simply fed into the existing dynamic of decline,
thereby becoming an integral factor in the continuation of Nigeria’s economic
crisis. Cumulatively, the SAP produced considerable hardship, poverty, and
discontentment across the Nigerian society. The middle class was overwhelmed
by declining purchasing power and unemployment. Coping mechanisms for some
workers included running their private cars as taxis to augment income after the
day’s work, while low income urban dwellers were driven to subsistence levels
and school children had to hawk wares to supplement family incomes.41
The SAP was eventually discontinued in 1994 under the General Sani
Abacha regime as part of his legitimization schemes. It was replaced with a policy
37
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of guided deregulation meant to enhance economic development by appropriate
discretionary interventions from the government.42 According to Kunle Amuwo,
the Abacha regime actually favored a statist economic policy, but certainly not a
nationalist agenda. Amuwo noted further that “this way Abacha set the tone and
tenor to pocket the economy and privatize state finances.”43

Abacha, Neoliberalism, and the Nigerian Textile Industry
The application of neoliberal policies in the Nigerian textile sector can be used to
dramatize the government’s wholesale mortgage of indigenous industrial fortunes
and their potential benefits. General Sani Abacha compounded the economic
misfortunes of the Nigerian manufacturing sector by extending the frontiers of
the neoliberal agenda to the textile sector with his decision to take Nigeria into
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 without providing safeguards.44
The WTO agreement opened Nigerian markets to all kinds of imported goods
and turned Nigeria into a dumping ground for frivolous imports. The agreement
was endorsed for political reasons – personally for Abacha to garner support and
sympathy from the international community, which had turned Nigeria into a
pariah state and perhaps to provide patronage for his cronies. No sooner had
Nigeria signed the WTO pact than Nigerian industries, including 135% textile
firms began crumbling like a pack of cards.45 The negative eﬀect of unbridled
importation subsequently led to a drastic decline in the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to Nigeria’s GDP.46 Cheap Chinese-made textiles against
which Nigerian firms could not favorably compete flooded Nigerian markets. Not
even the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) passed in the twilight
days of Clinton’s administration in the United States could reassure them.47 This
unbridled importation of textiles impoverished cotton farmers and brought untold
hardships on textile industry workers who were subsequently laid oﬀ because
locally produced textiles could not favorably compete with Chinese textiles which
were cheap.
No nation has developed without a textile industry. The textile industry
was one that set Britain on a path of sustainable economic growth in the mid
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nineteenth century. The textile industry uses relatively simple technology and it
is an industry well suited for Nigeria with its huge population and rich cotton
growing culture. Nigerian-made textiles had popularity in the export market and
gained prominence in places as distant as Dakar. In the mid-1980s, the industry
had about 350,000 people in over 200 mills. As of 2010, however, the Nigerian
textile industries had less than 2,000 persons in their employ.48 Nigeria’s public
enterprises were a serious drain on the national budget in the immediate postSAP years.49 Abacha did not change their fortunes in any positive way. According
to Kunle Amuwo, “a predatory regime like Abacha’s was characterized by a
distinctive pattern of economic management, including arbitrary change, deficit
financing, and capital flight. More importantly in the realm of social choice, the
“rationality” of the market was vitiated by the “logic” of rent seeking.50
The Abacha regime also made attempts to implement welfare policies and
programs to mitigate the adverse impact of its economic policy. A key model here
was the Petroleum Trust fund meant to rehabilitate public roads, fund education,
and provide critical infrastructure in the health sector. Its implementation was
skewed as it mediated well in the Northern part of Nigeria with marginal presence
in the Southern part. In all, it merely served to help perpetuate and legitimize
Abacha’s regime in Nigeria, who died in oﬃce in 1998.
In General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s attempt to administer the privatization
program, he aﬃrmed in his independence speech of October 1, 1998 that “the
public sector investments in the provision of services, utilities and goods have
yielded little dividends.”51 He subsequently set up the Bureau of Public enterprises
(BPE) to oversee the supervision of the sale of these public enterprises. The exercise
did not gain popular support because of the command nature of the military and
the incoming civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo literally
scrapped the Abubakar privatization program.

The Neoliberal Agenda of the Obasanjo Years
By 1999, the annual Gross Domestic product (GDP) in Nigeria averaged 2.25
percent while population growth averaged 2.8 percent. This mismatch was a
guarantee of mass poverty as the index was put at 67 percent, meaning no less
than eighty million Nigerians were absolutely poor. The cumulative eﬀects of
years of mis-governance had translated to economic stagnation, marked by a
low GDP, galloping inflation, high unemployment, falling per capita income,
48
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an energy crisis, and declining industrial capacity. Thus, in 1999, Obasanjo
inherited not only a fragile state and economy, but also a political economy driven
cyclically by trade shocks brought about by its dependence on oil. The regime
also inherited a collapsed industrial support infrastructure.52 The dysfunctional
state of federal utilities, which had been organizationally crippled by corruption,
ineﬃciency, and indebtedness, with many of them not having audited accounts
for many years, eventually informed Olusegun Obasanjo’s adoption of neoliberal
principles. Obasanjo invited the IMF and the World Bank to help provide second
level quality checks for his macroeconomic policies. Specifically, he invited the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Bretton
Woods institutions to advise the nation on privatization.53 According to the Bureau
for Public Enterprises (BPE), the IFC served as the sole adviser of the Federal
Government with respect to the eﬀective implementation of its privatization
program from its inception in 1999.54 However the IFC pulled out of Nigeria in
early 2001. It cited the auction of Nigeria’s international air traﬃc rights by the
Nigerian government as one of the main reasons for its withdrawal.55 Based on
these challenges, Obasanjo justified his privatization program as an exercise that
would reposition the government to concentrate resources on its core functions
and responsibilities while enforcing rules and policies so that markets can work
eﬃciently. The objective was to make the government leaner and more eﬃcient,
reduce waste and corruption, free up resources tied down by public enterprises,
and improve service delivery to the people. It was hoped that privatization would
introduce new capital, technical, and managerial eﬃciency in the privatized
enterprises, thereby reviving them, creating new jobs, and adding value to the
economy. A fundamental plank for implementation of the neoliberal ideology is
the Public-Private Partnership, an alternative source of infrastructure financing,
which is rooted in a complex but contractual relationship between government
and private sector organizations. Here, the private sector makes available the
social welfare services, and the government simply regulates such services and
provides an enabling environment. Just as Hanson and Hentz linked the adoption

52

The Nation Newspaper (Lagos), May 29, 2001, 36.
The Guardian Newspaper (Lagos) April 6, 2002.
54
Samuel Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy, 1999-2007: A Critical
Assessment,”2008, accessed January 23, 2013,
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/opessays/?u=Sam_Aluko_Federal_Government_Reform_
Agenda_and_the_Nigerian_Economy_1999_2007_A_Critical_Assessment.htm.
55
In excerpts of a letter to Obasanjo, IFC vice president Peter Woicke said that “the
opportunity for a successful near-term privatisation of Nigeria Airways has been diminished
by the auctioning act,” accessed April 15, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/05/financenigeria-international-finance-corporation-pulls-out-of-privatisation-venture/.
53

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Ekanade | 15
of neoliberal policies in South Africa and Zambia to domestic dynamics within
those jurisdictions, Nigeria’s adoption of neoliberal principles followed the same
logic because the policy obtained domestic support from the emerging middle and
elite class, as they possessed the finance capital to buy into the privatized firms,
with little or no support from the masses who saw it as further impoverishment.
The template for the framework of the economic reform agenda of President
Obasanjo was largely influenced by the IMF and World Bank (WB).56 Their core
prescriptions for Nigeria were: (a) Unbundling and privatization of the state
electricity company; (b) Legislation and technical assistance to promote domestic
gas sector reforms; (c) Liberalization of the down stream petroleum sector; (d)
Funding to address key infrastructure constraints; and (e) Legislations for bill
on fiscal responsibility, procurement and the extractive industries transparency
initiative. To drive this reform agenda, technocrats from these international
financial institutions who had neoliberal inclinations were brought on board
of President Obasanjo’s economic team. They included Ngozi Okonjo Iweala,
Oby Ezekwesili, and Soludo Charles who later became Governor of the Central
Bank of Nigeria. Their policy agenda was encapsulated in National Economic
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The IMF and World Bank were
heavily involved in funding the reform agenda. Since 2001, the World Bank has
given approximately $300 million in International Development Association (IDA)
credits for reform and privatization of Nigeria’s energy sector. However, the key
ingredients of the International Financial Institution’s policy advice meant to
shape Nigeria’s economic policies have so far led to a dysfunctional electricity
privatization process failing to eﬀectively provide pro-poor energy and encouraged
kleptocracy in the oil sector as they helped in perpetuating the conditions that
enable companies operating in the Niger Delta to maintain a monopoly over the
country’s natural resources.57
On privatization, Nigeria started a four-phased privatization program in
July 1999. The first phase involved the sale of the government’s shareholdings in a
dozen of commercially viable enterprises, including banks, petroleum marketing,
cement, and insurance companies. This was completed in December 2000. The
second phase, which was to be completed in 2001, rather started late. One salutary
impact of privatization was that all economic sectors and activities were exposed
to competition and private initiative. Privatization has created a large pool of
56
Obiora Chinedu Okafor, “The Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movement in
Nigeria’s Dual Economic and Political Transition, 1999-2005,” Journal of African Law 51, no.
1 (April, 2007), 77.
57
Lucy Baker, “Facilitating Whose Power? The IFI Policy Influence in Nigeria’s Energy
sector,” (2008), accessed January 22, 2013,
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/update/60/bwupdt60_ai.pdf.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

16 | Ekanade
new shareholders in Nigeria, bridging both income and geopolitical divides. It
has changed the structure and depth of the Nigerian capital market and created
awareness of the virtue of shared ownership as a form of savings. The program
has relieved the federal government of the huge and growing burden of financing
debts and deficits of public enterprises. It has in a way improved the allocative
eﬃciency of the national economy and enhanced the volume of corporate taxes
accruing in the national treasury.58
The downside of the privatization played out with the dynamics of the
privatization of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) a key item in the
second phase.59 The Obasanjo regime in February 2001 successfully auctioned
three Global Satellite Mobile (GSM) licenses and got expressions of interest from
strategic investors in NITEL. However ten years down the line, eﬀorts at selling
NITEL had been bungled repeatedly as China Unicom, the preferred bidder, had
not been able to raise suﬃcient funds to unbundle and revitalize it.60 NITEL was
hastily sold to Transcorp which rationalized NITEL staﬀ by 70 percent, that is
7,000 of the 10,000 staﬀ were retrenched because of the privatization exercise. ExPresident Obasanjo handed Transcorp back to the late President Yar’adua on May
27, 2007.61 The Obasanjo (1999-2007) regime virtually sealed the destruction of
the land telephony system in order to privatize it. In other countries, particularly
the industrialized ones, the land telephony is the main communication system
with the mobile telephone system serving as a subsidiary and emergency outfit to
complement the land telephone system.
The mobile telephone system has taken away much revenue from Nigerians
and from the economy to their providers within and outside Nigeria. The flight
of capital it has occasioned is excessive and most of the employment they created
is in the informal sector. By 1999, the estimated share of the urban labor force in
the informal sector in Lagos, Nigeria was 50 percent, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, 31
percent, Nairobi, Kenya 44 percent and Tunis, Tunisia 34 percent. Nigeria had the
highest figure.62 Under Obasanjo, the informal sector thrived and witnessed real
explosion in the mid-2000s as an enormous proportion of Nigeria’s population was
58
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employed in this sector. This was parallel to the development of the crisis and the
implementation of the SAP that led to massive layoﬀs. The share of people in the
informal economy in Nigeria is one of the highest in Africa and represented nearly
75 percent of non-oil GNP in 2003. This is a typical indicator of poverty63. The
world development indicator also gives credence to this assertion as employmentto-population ratio in Nigeria fell from 52 percent in 1991 to 51 percent in 2007,
and the population below global poverty line remained at an all-time high of 86.4
percent.64
Nigeria entered the third phase of privatization in 2004 by privatizing
nineteen enterprises. In 2005, it entered the fourth phase under Irene Chigbue,
privatizing forty six enterprises and thirty eight others in 2006. In the fourth
phase, major utilities such as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)
was unbundled into seventeen successor companies and established the National
Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC), which set the framework and
paved the way for the privatization of the electricity sector.65 Up to 2005, about
N225 billion of taxpayers’ funds were pumped into the power sector to revive
it alongside the unbundling program66. The result however is that the reforms
in the power sector have not translated into any meaningful changes. Power
supplies remained epileptic as no conscious attempts were made to build new
power generation and transmission plants. This development has had adverse
eﬀects on the manufacturing sector and small scale businesses where production
cost is high thereby making finished goods uncompetitive with their imported
counterparts. Another fall out of the spasmodic nature of the public power supply
in Nigeria is the job loss in the manufacturing sector. This has been massive given
the exorbitant production costs. In addition, considering the huge population
trapped in the informal sector, a substantial number of these artisans depend on
electricity to run their businesses. With frequent power outages, and the hike in
power tariﬀs by President Goodluck Jonathan (from N8.00 to N40.00 per kilowatt)67
the challenges of the masses is further compounded, and they are left jobless. A
substantial number have resorted to criminal activities in the nation. This explains
in part why arson, kidnapping, and other criminal activities and social vices are
thriving in the Niger Delta region and other parts of the Nigerian state.
It is also important to note that the Obasanjo regime’s inability to handle
63
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problems in the power sector defeated its initiative of an export substitution policy
in Nigeria.68 In fact, the import substitution industries (ISI) policy is the preferred
model for development in advanced economies as it encourages local production
instead of the importation of essential products. In terms of economic performance,
the structural transformation of Nigeria has been slow in the area of privatization.
Privatization itself has not worked well because of bad governance, corruption,
non-tariﬀ barriers, and an inadequate regulatory framework.69
In his last days in oﬃce President Obasanjo, sold the Kaduna and Port
Harcourt refineries valued at $800 billion in May 2007 for a paltry $500 million
to Blue Star Oil Service Limited, a consortium close to him.70 In addition, Eleme
Petrochemicals Plant in Port Harcourt, the largest of its kind in Africa was sold for
$225 million, an amount not even worth its spare parts. The unfortunate aspect
is that the Nigerian government was supposed to maintain a minimum share of
49 percent. However, Indorama, the buyer was given a 75 percent equity stake
in Eleme. The same occurred with the sale of Egbin Power Station, (the largest
generating station operated by Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria) which was
also grossly underpriced and sold oﬀ at a paltry N280 million or $2 million.71
Interestingly, the Nigerian Senate committee investigating the privatization
of public enterprises since 1999 came up with appalling revelations about the
Obasanjo regime. The committee discovered, through its public hearing that the
regime sold the Aluminum Smelting Company of Nigeria built at the cost of $3.2
billion to Russal, a Russian firm at the cost of $250 million. Only $130 million
of the said $250 million has been paid, leaving a balance of $120 million, which
was supposed to be used to dredge the Imo River as stated in the share purchase
agreement. Six years after the sale, the dredging is yet to begin and the government
has not been paid the balance of the money. In addition, no one has queried Russal
for failing to fulfill its obligations. Even if the cost of building the smelter was
inflated through the procurement process, there is no justifiable reason why an
asset worth $3.2 billion should be sold for $250 million.72
Delta Steel Company Limited presents another dimension of the fraud
and irregularities involved in the sale of Nigeria’s public enterprises under the
Obasanjo regime. Global Steel Infrastructure Limited, a company that did not
participate in the bidding process, except that it submitted an expression of
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interest, was declared the winner. BUA, which did the follow up with a technical
bid, did not get the benefit of the bid. The then Director General of the BPE, Julius
Bala rationalized this untoward act with the assertion that “there is a diﬀerence
between ‘the winner of a bid’ and ‘the preferred winner’ as there is the need for
approval from council.”73 To compound matters, Delta Steel was valued by BPE at
N225 billion but was sold for a paltry N 4.5 billion. These privatized enterprises
have not added any meaningful value to the state and people of Nigeria.
A total sum of N146.6 billion earned from the privatization process has been
remitted to the coﬀers of the Nigerian government since 1999. This is a paltry
sum considering that investments by the government in these enterprises run
into trillions of naira. The assets of the privatized enterprises were deliberately
undervalued, as rules and regulations governing the due process were subverted,
and this has allowed corruption to fester. Those who withstand the worst of the
government’s ineptitude now are the masses in the Nigerian state.74

Neoliberalism and Constitutionalism
The Nigerian state embraced planned and balanced economic development
before 1985. Systematic development plans were made. Planning of the Nigerian
economy ceased when the Babangida regime introduced the IMF and World Bank
imposed SAPs in 1986. However, poor economic planning has been more greatly
accentuated since 1999, through the deregulation, privatization, and downsizing
of the public service and general reform agenda of the Obasanjo regime, all
encapsulated in his National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy
(NEEDS).75 The economic philosophy of the government was hinged on the fact
that the “market” has violated the Nigerian constitution, not only by abdicating
the control of the major sectors of the Nigerian economy, but also by oﬀering
Nigeria for sale to domestic and foreign private interests. By 2006, the government
had divested from 116 enterprises.76 President Obasanjo’s government’s economic
philosophy was premised on the mistaken assumption that, for the federal
government to govern eﬃciently, it had to concentrate solely on governance. It
neglected the fact that a government that cannot manage an industry successfully
cannot govern eﬃciently.77
Part of the fallout of the privatization program which has been unpopular
with the Nigerian citizenry include the reversal of pension benefits of public
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servants under the Pension Reform Act of 2004 and the deduction from their
monthly wages for pension. Equally appalling are the non-payment of pensions and
gratuities, the non-creation of employment opportunities and the non-payment of
unemployment benefits to those forced into unemployment. 78 These are violations
of Article 16, section 2(d) of the Nigerian Constitution.79 The imposition of a
contributory pension scheme on public servants in the name of pension reform is
a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution, which seeks to protect the existing
pension rights of public servants.80 In the words of Lai Olurode, when pension
rights are not guaranteed, individuals exercise no scruples at engaging in corrupt
behavior in order to make ends meet. Thus, the denial of pension rights has further
deepened the challenge of endemic corruption prevalent in Nigeria
The neoliberal agenda of the Obasanjo regime also went against the spirit
and tenets of the Constitution on issues of educational objectives of the country.
Article 18, section 3 of the 1999 Constitution provides that government shall
strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this end, government shall, as and when
practicable, provide, free compulsory and universal primary education, free
secondary education, free university education and free adult literacy program.81
However, the government worked at cross purposes by introducing public-private
partnership (PPP) administration in unity schools (public schools). Fees were
consequently introduced in primary and secondary schools and, very exorbitant
fees in tertiary institutions alongside private universities. While the introduction
of fees progressively were reduced, budgetary allocation for education fell from
11.2 percent in 1999 to 1.8 percent in 2003, all against UNESCO’s recommendation
of 26 percent for developing countries. Budgetary shortfalls undermined
productivity of Nigerian intellectuals, starved knowledge institutions of vital
resources for research, and adversely aﬀected the quality of teaching and learning.
Cumulatively, it has led to the peripheralization for the country’s intellectual
community as an aspect of the general strategy of strengthening neocolonial
imperialism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it has created a knowledge weak Nigerian
state in a century that is knowledge driven. 82 Overall, the cumulative impact of all
these actions and inactions of government are that education at all levels is now
becoming increasingly less and less available to a decreasing percentage of the
Nigerian population, further deepening the impoverishment of not just the people
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but also the nation as a whole. Thus, Nigeria stands the risk of being delinked from
the gains and prospects of an increasingly globalized and competitive world.

Retrenchment in the Public Sector and Precarization of Labor
From the outset, a central thrust of neoliberal policies was wage and social
austerity for workers to restore the profitability of capitalist firms and the capacity
of the state to assist in economic restructuring.83 In line with this thinking, since the
inception of the Obasanjo regime in 1999, about 4.8 million Nigerians in the civil
service, statutory corporations, state owned companies, in the banks, and insurance
companies have been retrenched through the reform agenda of re-engineering the
public sector of the economy and minimizing the economic role of government.
It has continued to place emphasis on the private sector as the engine of growth
of the Nigerian economy, whereas the private sector in Nigeria is very weak
and depends on the public sector for its survival and continued growth. Given
the warped reform policy, the downsizing of the public sector has consequently
led to the downsizing of the private sector, because the economic managers in
government do not appreciate that a decelerating public sector also leads to a
decelerating private sector, and vice versa. All sensible reformers in history have
increased rather than reduced employment quantum in very significant manner.
Neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, privatization, commercialization, and
minimization of the role of the government in the economy do not collectively
oﬀer eﬀective results for reducing poverty, because they do not suﬃciently build
or rebuild human capital. The type of privatization pursued by the successive
Nigerian regimes has allowed cronyism, the plundering of national assets for the
benefit of the few in the elite class. 84 The policy model itself oﬀers very little and
warrants little or no support as a suﬃcient economic policy directive for serious
people-oriented policies. It does not address nor promote equitable income
distribution, or a decent economic and social environment. The regime overlooked
the political and social context of the malfunctioning public service. The reforms
do not address substantive issues of equity and social justice in light of the
distributive consequences of the restructuring. Consequently, the mere change of
ownership from public to private has not guaranteed change in productivity and
eﬃciency. This is besides the question of corruption and institutional crisis, which
may equally bedevil a private company. In fact, several private firms have not
performed much better than public companies in Nigeria 85
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Most of the resources derived from privatizing public enterprises, for
instance, has not been directed toward building human capital through education
and training, to stimulate productivity in the economy. Retrenchment of workers
with productive application of revenue further depressed the economy. In an ideal
situation, new competent workers would be employed and that would stimulate
the economy. Downsizing of the public sector has negative multiplier eﬀects.
Retrenchment leads to reduced consumer demand, which reduces the propensity
to produce, and in turn leads to a reduction in the rate of growth of the gross
domestic product. It is a suicidal economic policy.
Nigeria’s adoption of the New Economic Partnership for Development
(NEPAD), which is based on some classic pillars of neoliberal economic policies,
helps to dramatize the negative impact of privatization, using the activities of
South African firms in Nigeria as a case study. 86 NEPAD was adopted by African
states in October 2001 with the objective of regenerating and integrating African
economies.87 Under Obasanjo’s regime, then South African President Thabo Mbeki
surreptitiously used NEPAD as a platform to open up Nigeria’s economy to South
African investments and exports. The implications of this South African penetration
have been inimical to the robust growth of the Nigerian economy. Joseph Stiglitz,
a renowned economist and Nobel Prize winner, aﬃrmed that neither theory nor
economic evidence supports the claim that opening up your market can assure
robust economic growth.88 A case in point is the Nigerian telecommunication sector
where the South African firm, MTN is about the biggest player. MTN obtained its
operating license in Nigeria in 2001 after paying over $285 million as license fee
and another $1 billion to set up operations. In 2004 alone, MTN recorded an after
tax profit of over $2.4 billion in Nigeria.89 This amounts to over profiteering and
massive exploitation of Nigerians who are the subscribers.
A number of South African companies have also entered the fast food business
in Nigeria, controlling almost 50 percent of the international fast food franchises
in Nigeria. They are also making huge profits. In the media and entertainment
industry in Nigeria, a South African company such as DSTV accounts for 80
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percent of the viewers that watch satellite television in Nigeria.90 Despite all these
investments by South Africa in Nigeria, the people of Nigeria have not benefitted
much. This is partly because South African corporations operating in Nigeria are
allowed to repatriate the profits they make out of Nigeria. The majority of South
African firms in Nigeria also source most of the products that they use or sell in
Nigeria through South Africa and not locally, negating the creation of upstream or
downstream industries in Nigeria. South African companies operating in Nigeria
have also created very few jobs. The few they have created have tended to be
casual. Though not peculiar to South African companies, many Nigerians who
work in South African owned firms have been denied the right to join trade unions.
For example, MTN has only about 500 permanent jobs.91 Most of its employees are
casual or temporary workers.

Conclusion
Nigeria’s National Development Plans between 1962 and 1980 emphasized the
central role of the government in economic planning. This ensured progressive
development and stability of the economy and society. Military intervention
truncated the entire process as it progressively eclipsed public provision of social
welfare services, substituted it with ad-hoc welfare structures to legitimize and
perpetuate successive military rules, setting in motion the wholesale marketization
of social welfare services. The neoliberal orthodoxy was perpetuated paradoxically
by subsequent democratic regimes without the consent of the citizens. The
civil regimes privatized the state and substituted public good as private good,
overlooking the fact that governance is a social contract in which the individual
abrogates some of his rights to the state and in return enjoys some social benefits,
which fundamentally include protection of life, human dignity, and social welfare.
The neglect of the welfare of the citizenry has contributed immensely to the crisis
of development. More importantly, the proponents of neoliberal policies have
confessed that they did not consider the African or Asian economic scenes when
they propounded their economic manifesto, believing same to be valid for all
places and at all times. The proponents also admit that liberalization does not
necessarily imply a swing to market fundamentalism and a minimalist role for
government.92 For instance, the sponsors of the Bretton Woods institutions ensure
that neoliberalism coexists with strong protectionism and a desire to heavily
subsidize some markets in the United States.93 Neoliberalism has promoted
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various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule
and popular accountability. This has encouraged capital flight, authoritarianism,
corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented
casualization and precarization of labor. All of these have cumulatively deepened
poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the very essence of a democratic
state which ought to uphold social rights.
Rather than stick to the principles outlined by the Bretton Woods institutions,
a new economic policy should be employed that more adequately reflects the goals
of development and enhances the chances of local rather than foreign ownership
of the means of production for more rapid and equitable economic growth. The
government must practice home-grown development policies that fulfil the
developmental aspirations of the masses. Under the reign of neoliberalism in
Nigeria, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic
virtues have been undermined by a mindless celebration of the free market as
the model for organizing all facets of everyday life. Under attack is the social
contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social
provisions such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public
transportation, and education, all of which provided both safety nets and a set of
conditions upon which democracy could be experienced and critical citizenship
engaged.94
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Abstract: The Nigeria-Biafra War attracted enormous international
attention not just for the brutal events of the period, but also because of
how the conflict was interpreted, especially by foreigners. The ghastly
images of victims of the war dominated the international media and
roused the world’s conscience. The conflict took a toll on human
lives on both the Igbo and the ethnic minorities in Biafra. While the
Igbo tragedy was largely perpetrated in Northern Nigeria, that of the
Biafran minorities – Efik, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ibibio – occurred mainly in their
homelands. The gory experiences suﬀered by the Biafran minorities
have largely been neglected in the historiography of the Biafra War.
This paper examines the experiences of the ethnic minorities in Biafra
during the war between July 1967 and January 1970. It argues that the
minorities suﬀered a high degree of persecution, molestation, injustice,
psychological torture and other forms of suﬀering which have not been
fully examined in existing literature. The war subjected them to layers
of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority and the Biafran
government. The paper asserts that these minority groups in Biafra
were as much victims of the war as the Igbo. Hence, they should be
accorded due recognition in the historiography of victimhood in the
Nigeria-Biafra War.
Keywords: Biafra; Ethnic; Igbo; Massacre; Minorities; Nigeria; Victims;
War.

Introduction
The idea of “minority” is a concept that has posed some definitional problems
among scholars. Owing to the fluidity of the concept, there has not been any
internationally accepted definition. The earliest attempt to provide a definition for
the term was made in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, the former Special Rapporteur
of the United Nations, who defined minority as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in
a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State
– possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics diﬀering from
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions,
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religion or language.1
The problem with this definition is that it only covers persons belonging to ethnic,
religious, or linguistic minorities. There is no provision for other minority groups
in terms of diﬀerent social categories grounded in sexuality, gender, age, class,
race, etc.
Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted in
1992 recognizes minorities as a group of people with similar national or ethnic,
cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that states should protect
their existence.2 The article makes reference to the same groups already identified
by Capotorti. But other groups such as sexual minorities, gender minorities, age
minorities, and other minorities who also need rights, are omitted and consequently
appear voiceless and unprotected. With the rapidity of socio-cultural, political,
and economic changes taking place all over the world, the concept of minority
continues to pose more questions than can easily be answered. A more workable
definition of minority should thus be seen in terms of context. Based on this, I
define minority quite broadly as any group of people that is disadvantaged when
compared to the rest of the population. The “minoritization” of a group should
therefore be seen in terms of the situation and not just numerical weakness. For
instance, a group can be a majority in terms of numerical strength but a minority in
terms of political representation. In this situation, the group sees itself as a political
minority and agitates for equality and justice. The minorities referred to in this
paper are the ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and they are minorities because of both
their numerical weakness and poor representation in the national politics.

The Igbo Victims
The Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 15, 1970.
The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its
independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who
were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The federal government of Nigeria
responded to the secession with “police action,” that is, a partial military operation
designed to crush what it perceived as a rebellion. These actions were the beginning
of a war that lasted about thirty months. But what was originally interpreted as a
1
Francesco Capotorti quoted in Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), “Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance
for Implementation” HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf, 2.
2
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and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December
18, 1992,” accessed February 28, 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
MinorityRights en.pdf.
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domestic conflict later took on an international dimension as state and non-state
actors like Britain, the USSR, France, the Red Cross, and the World Council of
Churches became involved in the conflict. The war received one of the highest
humanitarian interventions in recent history. The massive number of children and
women facing starvation attracted the attention of groups like the World Council
of Churches, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Caritas Internationalis,
Interreligious Aﬀairs for the American Jewish Committee, and UNICEF.3 The
relief eﬀort resulted in unusual Jewish-Christian co-operation.4 Countries like
the United States, Germany, France, and the Nordic Countries made enormous
contributions towards the relief eﬀort.5 The international media also highlighted
the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn region and successfully brought this part
of the world into global focus. The New York Times, The London Times, La Stampa of
Italy, and Le Monde of France were some of the newspapers that eﬀectively covered
the war.
The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War,
both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo were targeted
for extermination by the Muslim north. A year before the war, during the 1966
massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the alleged indiscriminate bombing
of civilian targets and the widespread hunger in secessionist Biafra did a lot to
rouse the world’s conscience to the humanitarian crisis facing Biafran peoples.
The international media played a significant role in exposing the humanitarian
tragedies, especially in the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra. And many years after the
war, scholarly accounts of the war, mostly by scholars from the Igbo-speaking parts
of Baifra, have privileged insights into some of the most hideous acts unleashed
on Biafrans during the war. Yet, not much has been reported about the atrocities
perpetrated against the minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces
and the Biafran militias. This is a gap in Biafra’s history.
Newsweek, in one of its reports titled “The Resurrection of Biafra,” stated that
“some of the worst massacres of the war, in fact, occurred when federal troops
captured minority regions -whereupon the minority tribesmen turned on the Ibos
in bloody fury.”6 This quote presents the Igbo as the victims in the hands of the
minority groups, without reference to any experience the minorities might have
3
National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/
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4
NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition,
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had in the Igbo-dominated region before the arrival of the federal troops. Another
report claimed that “in some areas outside the East which were temporarily held
by Biafran forces, as in Benin and the Mid-Western Region, Ibos were killed by
the local people with at least the acquiescence of the federal force: about 1,000 Ibo
civilians perished at Benin in this way.”7 Nigerian troops were said to have hunted
and killed Igbo males above the age of five, leaving the impression that the war was
waged in a genocidal spirit.8 Colin Legum, a Commonwealth correspondent for
The Observer, London, also noted that “the worst killing occurring among the Ibos
has come from the struggle itself that inevitably produced conditions of famine.”9
Peter Enahoro, who seemed to have sympathised with Biafra wrote: “The Ibos are
bearing the burden that rightly belongs to all who sought progress for Nigeria.”10
Gordon Wainman, a volunteer for the Canadian University Service Overseas at
Kurra Falls in Nigeria, reported the massacre of 30,000 Igbos in Northern Nigeria.11
Wainman said that many of those who were killed were either buried in mass
graves or left to rot in the fields with a thin layer of dirt thrown over them to
reduce the stench of the decaying flesh.
While not denying the gruesome atrocities committed against the Igbo during
the Biafra War, there is an error in the representation of the victims of the massacres.
For instance, some of the victims of the 1966 massacre in Northern Nigeria were
members of minority groups but were generally grouped with Igbos. The report
of the G. C. M. Onyiuke-led tribunal clearly shows that many people belonging to
ethnic minority groups in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria were victims of the
May 1966 attack perpetrated by Northerners.12 Members of the minority groups
were easily mistaken for Igbos because it was diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate between the
two by mere physical appearance. There were no facial marks as could be found
among the Hausa and the Yoruba, and the pattern of dressing, mostly western,
was similar. N. U. Akpan, Secretary of Government, Republic of Biafra, noted:
The killings in North in 1966, particularly those which occurred from
7
Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People,” The New York Review ix, no. 11, December
21, 1967.
8
Ibid.
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10
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the end of September, were indiscriminately directed against people
from Eastern Nigeria, known in the North by the generic name of
Yameri...The subsequent attempts in the North to distinguish between
the Ibos and other peoples of Eastern Nigeria came too late to make
any impression on the non-Ibo members of Eastern Nigeria, who now
shared the same fears and dread of the North as the Ibos.13
The indiscriminate killing of members of Eastern Nigeria accounted for the divided
loyalty of the minority leaders. While some supported the Biafran secession, others
felt it was better to remain as Nigerians.

The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in Nigeria
Nigeria, like most African countries, is a multiethnic society with many ethnic
minorities. The ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to
Efik, Ibibio, and Ijaw, and are located along the Eastern border and the oil rich
southern coast. They are found in the present-day Cross River, Akwa-Ibom,
Rivers, and Bayelsa States, forming a larger part of the area now known as the
Niger-Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of
Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent.
Although these designated minority groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated
Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All
the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language,
and cultural practices.
Part of the overarching argument about the war is that it was a war of two
majority ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo.14 This interpretation is
simplistic and available evidence suggests otherwise. It was rather a war between
the minorities and the majorities in Nigeria. The first and second military coups
on January 15 and July 29, 1966 respectively, ushered in a historic moment in the
history of the minorities in Nigeria. The Richard’s Constitution of 1947 created
a faulty regional structure that encouraged regionalism in Nigeria’s postindependence politics. Apart from the fact that one of the regions was large enough
to dominate the other two regions, the political parties in the federation were
regionally oriented with politicians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo,
and Ahmadu Bello, depending on ethnic and regional support to achieve national
power. For instance, the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was seen as
an Igbo party while the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa, was considered a
Hausa-Fulani party. The Action Group was called a Yoruba party because its
leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was Yoruba. Within the existing regional structure,
13
14
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minority aspirations were sometimes ignored but could easily be used to promote
party propaganda.15 Leaders of the minority ethnic groups found themselves in
a disadvantaged position in the entire federal political equation. It was against
this background that minority leaders in diﬀerent regions formed movements
that started agitating for the creation of more states where their interests could
be adequately protected. Some of the major movements that were formed before
independence included the Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement in the
Eastern Region, the Mid-West State Movement in the Western Region, and the
Middle-Belt State Movement in the Northern Region. These movements were
neither cultural nor national groups but were “situationally” or circumstantially
formed to agitate for minority rights in the larger state. Though not homogenous,
the ethnic minorities were able to form formal structures that represented their
groups, a development that challenges constructivist arguments that the “lack of
pure identities means that groups are not homogenous and cannot be represented
through formal structures.”16
The leaders of these state creation movements believed that the formation
of more states would eliminate their fears of domination by the majority ethnic
groups. This concern led to the setting up of the Minorities Commission by the
colonial authorities in 1957.17 It was evident that state creation would allay the
fears of the minorities and guarantee more stability in the federation, but the
Commission pointed out that if new states were created, they would be given
two years to settle down before independence could be granted to the country.18
As events later revealed, the euphoria of gaining the long awaited independence
blinded the national leaders to other realities. As the domination of the minorities
continued, riots from minority areas like Tiv lingered. The Tiv under the leadership
of Joseph Tarka had agitated for the creation of the Middle-Belt State. The MidWest minorities in the former Western Region formed their own state as a result
of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroon (NCNC) plot against the Action Group (AG – a Yoruba-led party). The
Mid-West creation was a way of weakening the influence of the Action Congress
in the Western Region.
The growing agitations of groups dedicated to improving the fortunes of
minorities in Nigeria received a remarkable boost by Nigeria’s first and second
15
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coups of the late 1960s. While the first coup dismantled the influence of the
Hausa-Fulani potentates, the second coup dislodged the Igbo from their positions
of military control. These developments altered the balance of power and ethnic
minorities in the army and civil service became central players in Nigerian politics.
General Yakubu Gowon, who is Ngas, a minority ethnic group in the Northern
Region, had Colonel Akahan, a Tiv, as his Chief of Staﬀ. Some commentators
interpreted the new leadership structure as the government of Middle-Belt
minorities that emerged to dominate politics of Northern Nigeria.19 When Lt.
Colonel Joseph Akahan died in a plane crash, some leaders of the Middle-Belt
region accused Northern leaders of masterminding his death.20 Although there
was no evidence linking Akahan’s death to Northern leaders, the ensuing
controversy led to the withdrawal of Tivs from diﬀerent parts of the North to
Tiv land. At the centre of the civil service were minority group members such as
Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, and A. A. Atta, who were regarded as the “superpermanent secretaries” because of their influence. People also regarded these
“super-permanent Secretaries” as members of the “Oxford tribe” because they had
received their degrees from Oxford University.21 Ayida and Asiodu, particularly,
belonged to Gowon’s three-member kitchen cabinet.22 Edwin Ogbu, who was a
Permanent Secretary in charge of External Aﬀairs, was equally a minority from the
Middle-Belt. Apart from Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, some of the commissioners
who largely championed the war politics were of minority ethnic origin. Anthony
Enahoro, Commissioner, Ministry of Information and Okoi Arikpo Commissioner,
Ministry of External Aﬀairs were minority members. There were obviously other
members of Gowon’s cabinet from the majority ethnic groups but those of the
minority ethnic groups appeared to have wielded more influence. The NigeriaBiafra War era was perhaps the first time members of the minority groups could
occupy many important positions in the military, politics, and civil service. The
assistance provided to Gowon by the increased number of minorities in the civil
service and army was critical in the administration’s successful prosecution of the
Nigerian civil war.
The minorities’ ascendancy after the July 1966 coup created an opportunity
for them to address the grievances which they had long expressed through their
movements. The project of state creation came at a time when the country was in a
political stalemate. The coups and countercoups, the massacres of Igbos in diﬀerent
19
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parts of Nigeria, the failure to implement the Aburi Accord by the Nigerian
government, the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the creation of twelve
states by General Gowon worsened the tension between Nigeria and Biafra. It was
a clash of rights, and both General Ojukwu and General Gowon seemed to have
legitimate claims. Biafrans claimed the right to survival while Nigerians claimed
the right to the corporate existence of the country. Two new states were carved out
of the former Eastern Region, leaving it with a total of three states. This seemed to
be a trump card for the federal government to court the minorities and forestall
the Eastern secession. That was obviously the immediate objective but the long
term goal of the minority leaders in state creation was to liberate the minorities
from majority dominance. While the argument in favour of state creation was
ostensibly to ensure stability and national unity, it was no less a struggle of the
minorities against the old dominant majorities in the various regions. Within the
Hausa-Fulani leadership, state creation was considered a dangerous development,
but to the new states like Kwara and Benue-Plateau, it was an opportunity to get
liberated from the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.23 For some of the ethnic minorities in
the former Eastern Region, state creation meant liberation from the alleged Igbo
domination.

Ethnic Minorities as Victims in Biafra
Violent conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict serious injuries and create
victims of all kinds. To the outside world, the known victims of the war were the Igbo
who, apart from being targets of the 1966 massacres, also suﬀered indiscriminate
bombings and monumental starvation that allegedly took about two million lives.
Within the forty-two years since the war ended, more revelations about the war
atrocities on the minorities have emerged. Surviving records and oral histories of
the war suggest that minorities in Biafra became individual and collective victims
of the war. These accounts also reveal how individuals and groups committed
heinous atrocities under the pretext of either fighting a war of survival for Biafra
or a war of national unity for Nigeria.
One recurrent question that comes up about the Biafran minorities is: what
was the attitude of the minorities to the Biafran secession? This cannot be answered
with certainty. While Biafra claimed that the minorities were wholeheartedly in
support of the secession, the federal government maintained that the minorities
had been longing to be liberated.24 Suzanne Cronje, one of the most prolific
journalists on the Biafra war, observed that “the feelings of the minorities were
23
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diﬃcult to define.”25 In the first place, the anti-Igbo uprising which would have
come from the minorities as people that needed liberation did not emerge, nor
was there any noticeable form of unrest among the minorities under the Biafran
administration. Loyalties were, in fact, divided. The supporters of the Biafran
secession were those who felt that the Easterners as a group had shared the same
fate as victims of the 1966 massacres and expulsion from the North, while those
who joined the Nigerian government saw it as an opportunity to have a separate
state of their own and be free from any domination. Although the ethnic minorities
had clamoured for a separate state of their own, it was very diﬃcult to determine
what they actually wanted during the war. A plebiscite could have given them an
opportunity to express themselves but the proposal was strongly rejected by the
federal government who felt it would imply a withdrawal of the federal troops to
the prewar boundaries.26
To understand the divergent attitudes of the minorities to the Biafran
secession, an examination of oral histories from people who occupied positions of
authority during the war as well as from ordinary people is necessary. The Ikun in
the present day Cross River State presents a good example of the crimes committed
against the minorities. The Ikun clan is in the Biase Local Government Area of
Cross River State. The people share a common boundary with the Ohafia, an Igbo
clan, in the present day Abia State. When the war broke out, Biafra stationed some
of its troops in the Cross River region, including Ikun. According to a female
survivor-victim of the Biafran occupation, the Ikun initially supported Biafra and
had friendly relations with the soldiers, who were also accommodating. As time
went on, tensions emerged. Some Ikun men were suspected of collaborating with
Nigerian soldiers. This led to arrests, looting, rapes, and other atrocities in Ikun
land.27 William Norris of the London Times who visited Biafra, also reported an eyewitness account in which some men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at
Umuahia on April 2, 1968.28 These Ibibios who included old men and young men
were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They
were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people attacked
them with sticks and clubs.29 Oral testimony by the survivor-victim corroborates
25
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this account. According to the eyewitness, Biafran soldiers allegedly took Ikun
men to Ohafia for a meeting but never brought them back. The informant also
alleged that the soldiers returned to the community and rounded up some men
within their reach and shot them. This survivor who lost her four-day old son and
her grandmother seemed to have suspected foul play from the Ohafia people who
share a common boundary with her community. The victimization continued
until the Biafran headquarters likely issued an order that people should not be
killed again.30 By this time, the remaining people had escaped the community,
leaving behind only the soldiers, the Ohafia, and some Ikun who were said to be
of mixed blood - half Ohafia and half Ikun. These remaining groups, according to
the survivor-victim shared the fish ponds, forests, and farms belonging to Ikun
people. 31
In a related account, B. J. Ikpeme, a member of a minority group and retired
Senior Medical Oﬃcer in the then Eastern Region revealed atrocities perpetrated
by Biafran soldiers against the minorities in some towns in the present-day Cross
River and Akwa- Ibom States. Ikpeme argued that Ojukwu’s declaration of the
Republic of Biafra had been issued against the wishes of the majority of the people
of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces, who for many years had agitated for a
separate state of their own. According to Ikpeme, the Igbo leadership, who did
not like the minority agitation, decided either to force the five million non-Igbo
minorities into the new republic or eliminate them. It was on this basis, claims
Ikpeme, that Biafran soldiers were quickly sent to the minority areas to “keep down
the people, detain or even kill all who dared raise a voice in protest against the
idea of Biafra.”32 It was during this period that the non-Igbos started experiencing
diﬀerent forms of inhumane treatment, ranging from torture, detention, to killing.
Ikpeme himself was detained in what he described as a “concentration camp” and
was later transferred to a prison cell where he was given urine to drink when he
demanded water.33
Ikpeme described instances where the Biafran soldiers allegedly perpetrated
atrocities against some members of non-Igbo groups. In Asang town in Enyong,
from where Ikpeme originated, about four hundred people were carried away
to an unknown destination. Another town called Attan Onoyon in the same
30
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Enyong was burnt down with many people killed by the Biafran soldiers. In Ikot
Ekpenyong in the present day Akwa Ibom State, Biafran soldiers were said to
have shot many villagers. Ikpeme also recounted that similar killings carried out
by Biafran soldiers took place in places like Ikot Okpot and Idoro. He equally
alleged that when the Nigerian troops landed in Calabar on October 18, 1967,
about 169 civilians in detention were lined up and shot by Biafran soldiers. This
same allegation had also been published in The New York Times as an informational
advertisement by the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in New
York.34 These two accounts, given by the survivor-victim of Ikun and Dr. Ikpeme,
portray similar pictures of gross atrocities but with diﬀerent underlying objectives.
Biafra ran a special operations group known as the Biafran Organization
of Freedom Fighter (BOFF). This was a paramilitary organization set up by the
civil defence group in Bende.35 This special operations group was instructed to
suppress the enemy, but they apparently targeted some minorities in Cross River
and Akwa Ibom States on the account of sabotage against the Biafran government.36
Philip Eﬃong, who was from one of the ethnic minorities, probably ordered
the BOFF’s “combing” operations after the death of one Major Achibong. In an
interview, the informant did not reveal the circumstances surrounding the death
of Major Achibong who was equally a member of a minority group. He argued
that if Eﬃong ordered any “combing” operation, it could not have been aimed
at exterminating members of his ethnic group. What the informant’s testimony
reveals is that some members of the BOFF who also operated as the Bende Special
Operations group could have taken advantage of the assignment to accomplish
selfish interests. For instance, an intriguing revelation about the Bende Special
Operations group shows that some of its members decapitated their victims for
ritual purposes.37 Head-hunting in warfare was a cultural practice in some parts
of Biafra known as Old Bende. This tradition survived up to the beginning of the
twentieth century. In the pre-colonial era, it was culturally acceptable for members
of a certain age-grade to go to war and come back with human heads as trophies.
Successful warriors who brought back trophies were highly honoured among
members of their age-grades and in the whole community. The war situation
might have created an opportunity for the warrior group to reactivate a tradition
that had faded out as a result of Western influence.
Although all the minority groups suﬀered diﬀerent forms atrocity, the
34
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minorities in the Rivers area seemed to be worse oﬀ. Apart from torture and other
forms of human rights abuse, they were also evicted from their homes. For instance,
when two strategic villages on the New Calabar and Sombriero Rivers fell to the
federal troops in February 1968, the news that followed was that the majority
of the soldiers that led the operation were Rivers young men, predominantly
Kalabari. As a consequence, many people from Bakana, one of the major Kalabari
towns, were removed and sent to Igbo towns like Umuahia, Owerri, Abiriba, and
Ozuitem, most likely to avoid further infiltration of the enemies.38 Chief Samuel
Mbakwe, who served as Biafran Provincial Administrator for Okigwe Province,
noted the influx of refugees from Port Harcourt but did not explain whether or
not they were forcibly removed by the Biafran forces.39 We do know that Biafrans
tended to regard anyone who stayed at his post and was overrun by the federal
advance as a collaborator. An Irish priest who served in Rivers State reported
that the Igbo soldiers were suspicious of some Rivers people who sometimes led
federal troops through their lines along hidden creeks.40 This attitude, according
to the priest, created a mixture of panic, fear, and hatred among the Biafran troops
towards some indigenous people of Rivers State. People who were maltreated
were said to have been involved in this act of “sabotage” against Biafra.
At Bolo and Ogu in Okirika, and Onne in Eleme, the villagers suﬀered the
same fate. After the battle at Onne, Biafran troops removed the town inhabitants
suspected to have collaborated with federal troops and sent them to the Rainbow
Town headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade in Port Harcourt. Graham-Douglas,
who was also thrown into detention, claimed to have seen about three hundred
men detained in the Rainbow Town. He asserted that no fewer than six thousand
Rivers people were sent to diﬀerent refugee camps in Igboland.41
It is important to point out that propaganda played a prominent role in the
Nigeria-Biafra war. Some of the pamphlets published by Nigeria and Biafra or their
agents were loaded with misinformation. Commenting on a section of GrahamDouglas’ pamphlet titled, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion, John Tilney of
Liverpool observed, “That may be propaganda. What Graham-Douglas says may
not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda by both sides.” 42 Both
Biafra and Nigeria professionally engaged propaganda as a potent tool in the war.
While Biafra hired Markpress, Nigeria engaged the services of Galatzine Chant
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Russell and Partners for the public relations job.43 Graham-Douglas’ story that the
minorities in Biafra had suﬀered more hardships and molestations than the Igbo
could claim to have suﬀered at the hands of Northern Nigerians was apparently
part of Nigeria’s propaganda which he also presented in London in August 1968.44
Graham-Douglas’ comments about Biafra had been criticised by an oﬃcial of the
British High Commission for lack of inside information about Biafra.45 He was
equally described as talking “out of the back of his head” because of unverifiable
comments he made about the Catholic Church.46
J. O. J. Okezie observed that Graham-Douglas’ switch to the Nigerian side
might have led to the Igbo attitude of distrust towards the minorities. He pointed
out however, that the sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The
Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suﬀered the same intimidation
and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained
by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha
and Enugu.47 A brigadier in the Biafran Army narrated his personal experience in
the sabotage accusation. The oﬃcer stated that two members of a local militia had
written an anonymous petition against him. When the writers were discovered,
they confessed that they had undertaken to cut down his popularity. The two
oﬃcers were brought before Ojukwu by Major General Eﬃong who ordered their
execution. The oﬃcer in his magnanimity refused to execute the petition writers.48
This illustrates how the sabotage syndrome assumed a life of its own and became
an instrument of victimization against innocent persons. There is no doubt that
many people lost their lives without substantial evidence, as is common during
times of war whether in Africa or elsewhere.
Violence towards the minorities was not perpetrated only by the Biafran
troops. The federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In Andoni area of
Rivers for example, an appeal was sent to the Biafran Head of State narrating how
the villages were attacked on Sunday, March 31, 1968 as a result of their loyalty to
Biafra. The report alleged that the attack was led by five collaborators who were
likely members of the minority group. One of the victims of the attack was said
to be an undergraduate student of the University of Ibadan who was a member
of the Biafran Provincial Enlightenment Committee. Apart from burning down
43
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houses and property, the petitioners also alleged that over 500 persons including
children were killed. 49 Similarly, approximately 2,000 Efiks were reportedly killed
in Calabar by the federal troops. The victims were said to be returnees who
revolted against the federal occupation. The killing was reported to Gowon who
subsequently appointed Dr. J. B. Ikpeme as Chief Justice when the killing had
nearly been completed.50
The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities’ areas. They were
accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of
the London Sunday Times in an article titled, “Nightmare in Biafra,” reported how
the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centres in Biafra.
He stated that,
Slowly, but eﬀectively, a reign of terror has been created. The ruins of
Mary Slessor Memorial Hospital at Itu, of the hospital of Itigidi, and of
the Cheshire Home at Port Harcourt, stand as a kind of grisly memorial
to something that must be if words are to retain any meaning. It is
certainly not war.51
These targets were all in the minority areas. Cronje similarly reported that the
Nigerian Air Force had bombed the minorities as much, if not more than the
Igbos.52
The plight of the minorities had been so alarming that several Nigerian
students of Rivers State origin in London staged a peaceful protest against the
killing and displacement of their people. In addition to a peaceful march from
Trafalgar Square to the House of Commons in London, they also sent out petitions
to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), His Holiness
Pope Paul VI, Emperor Haile Selaisie, the British Prime Minister and other relevant
groups, asking them to bring pressure on the warring parties to stop the senseless
killing of innocent and defenceless people of Rivers State.53 The petition may not
have produced any direct result but must have contributed to the pressure on the
warring parties to negotiate for peace.
The war had been fought not just for political reasons but also for economic
motives with oil resources in mind. And for a national economy that had begun
to depend on oil, control of the oil-bearing region that was inhabited by the ethnic
minorities became crucial to winning the war. Recent discoveries by the Ministry
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of Defence-sponsored humanitarian demining project buttress the claim that the
oil rich minority areas were hotly contested in the war. Although the war had
ended, people in diﬀerent parts of the then Biafra continued to die from accidental
explosion of unexploded mines. According to Emeka Uhuegbu, the field
administrator of the United Nations mandated demining project, the minority
areas of Rivers State had the highest number of landmine victims. Akwa Ibom and
Imo States follow on the list.54 The demining team discovered 400 unexploded
bombs in a forest in Rivers State. These bombs and landmines had killed several
unsuspecting villagers who went to farm, resulting in the nickname, “evil forest.”55

Conclusion
Brutal conflicts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War inflict painful injuries on all people.
The few cases examined in this article show that the ethnic minorities were also
individually and collectively victimized. Gowon’s creation of new states and
Ojukwu’s declaration of the Republic of Biafra created a sharp division among
ethnic minorities. This meant loyalties and disloyalties to the two warring parties.
Upholding Nigeria’s principle of twelve-state structure meant sabotage to Biafra,
while supporting Biafra’s secession implied rebellion to the Nigerian government.
The minorities in the oil-rich region seemed to have been worse oﬀ in the war. The
warring parties wanted to control the region and its oil resource. It was largely for
this reason that the region assumed strategic importance and became a theatre of
war.
General Gowon’s declaration of “No Victor, No Vanquished” after Biafra’s
capitulation was a good social therapy that helped calm the war tensions among
the groups that were involved in the conflict. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the
war are still present in the minority areas. The unexploded bombs in these highly
contested areas still pose a huge threat. People continue to lose their legs and lives
following accidental explosions. The victims of these accidental explosions are yet
to be given adequate rehabilitation.56
Despite the suﬀerings of the ethnic minorities during and in the aftermath of
the war, their perspective in the civil war discourses remains almost forgotten. Their
victimhood, like that of the Igbo, should be accorded a place in the historiography
of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The struggle for Nigeria’s unity wouldn’t have been
possible without the minorities. The struggle over control of the oil-rich region
placed them in a disadvantaged position by exposing them to more dangers and
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destruction. Recognizing the ethnic minorities as victims would place them in
their rightful position in the nation’s history.
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Dávila, Jerry. Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of
African Decolonization, 1950–1980. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010, ix + 312 pp.
Jerry Dávila’s Hotel Trópico is a masterful study of international relations through
the lens of intercultural relations and is perhaps the most persuasive scholarship to
demonstrate concretely the ways in which cultural factors can impact the direction
of a nation-state’s foreign policy. Two of the key themes that underpin Dávila’s work
are the ideas of “lusotropicalism” and “racial democracy.” Lusotropicalism was a
term coined by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre to describe the supposedly
distinctive Portuguese mindset which made Portugal a better colonizer than
other Europeans. According to Freyre, because of Portugal’s warmer climate and
closer proximity to the equator, the Portuguese were more adaptable to tropical
climates, more open to the mixing of races, and thus had a more humane type of
colonialism. For Freyre, and many others, Brazil stood as a shining example of the
benevolence of Portuguese colonialism, particularly through its racial democracy,
under which Brazilians purportedly lived in complete racial harmony in a society
without racial discrimination. According to Dávila, “this set of beliefs was so
powerful that it formed the conceptual framework not only of those Brazilians
who supported Portuguese colonialism but even of those who shunned Portugal,
favored decolonization, and sought ties with independent African nations” (21).
Dávila shows how at various times throughout the Cold War, most notably
in 1961 as part of President Janio Qaudros’s “Independent Foreign Policy” and
in 1975 in its involvement in the Angolan civil war, the Brazilian government
tried to use its historical ties to Africa in tandem with the ideas of lusotropicalism
and racial democracy to help Brazil form relations with African states. According
to Dávila, Brazil thought that “Africa was its natural sphere of influence, and
racial democracy was its calling card. In turn, Africa would help propel Brazil
industrially and bring autonomy from the cold war powers” (51). But this eﬀort
was complicated by the fact that the country was run by a conservative military
dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, it largely supported Portuguese colonialism when
nearly every other country in the developing world, especially in Africa, opposed
it, and it eschewed neutrality to remain tied to the Western camp in the Cold War.
These factors combined to make Brazil’s outreach to Africa a limited success at
best.
Despite obstacles along the way, Dávila argues that “the connections
between Brazil and Africa endured” due to the fact that “Africa remained an
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abstraction in Brazil, a canvas on which Brazilian national aspirations and racial
values were rendered. This canvas is significant because of the perception that
all Brazilians share an African heritage” (255). While Brazil and The Challenge
of African Decolonization is a worthwhile read for Africanists and diplomatic
historians as an intriguing study of Brazil’s bilateral relations with sub-Saharan
Africa during the middle of the Cold War, the book is more than that. It is also
an impressive blend of the study of race and culture to examine how Brazilian
foreign policy became conditioned by how white Brazilian elites perceived their
place in the world. By projecting their constructed mythical image of a racially
harmonious and discrimination-free Brazil onto Africa, Brazilian diplomats hoped
that Afro-Brazilians would accept their government’s portrait of national identity
and domestic race relations. In reality, the opposite proved true. The few AfroBrazilians who visited Africa learned of the fallacy of Brazilian racial democracy,
and, at the same time, discovered that they were much more “Brazilian” than they
were “African.”
One interesting historiographical debate which emerges from the pages
of Hotel Trópico is about the primary reason that Brazil decided to recognize
the MPLA government in Angola in 1975 and the main protagonist of that
decision. James Hershberg, whose work was not cited by Dávila, writing from
an American perspective and as a diplomatic historian using both U.S. and
Brazilian government documents, argues that Brasilia’s decision for recognition
of the MPLA stemmed from the declining Cold War consensus in Latin America
and Brazil’s cultural aﬃnity for Angola. In short, the Brazilian leadership felt a
Lusophonic kinship for Angola and by the mid-1970s no longer felt the need to
keep in lock step with Washington’s wishes.1 Dávila, on the other hand, writing
from a Brazilian perspective and as an expert of that country’s racial and social
history, emphasizes Brasilia’s economic incentives for recognizing the MPLA
government as a way to sustain Brazil’s “economic miracle” of the 1970s. These
interpretations do not necessarily contradict, but rather complement each other,
providing greater nuance to our understanding of Brazilian decision-making. The
two historians also seemingly disagree over who was the central force behind this
policy, with Dávila focusing on Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira and
Hershberg Italo Zappa, the head of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry’s Africa and
Asia Department, and each author barely mentioning the other in their accounts.
1
See James G. Hershberg, “’High-spirited Confusion’: Brazil, the 1961 Belgrade NonAligned Conference, and the Limits of an ‘Independent Foreign Policy during the High
Cold War” Cold War History, 7, no. 3 (August 2007): 373-388 and especially Hershberg,
“‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the
MPLA Government in Angola” (paper presented at the Southern Africa in the Cold War Era
Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009).
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The book’s strengths are numerous. Deeply researched, Dávila utilizes a vast
array of sources including memoirs, oral histories, and interviews of diplomats
involved in Brazilian relations with Africa; newspapers from three continents;
and primary source research in more than fifteen diﬀerent archives in Brazil and
Portugal. The book is also well written and free of unnecessary academic jargon,
making it an easy read for undergraduate students (indeed, I intend to assign it
for use in future classes).
Unsurprisingly the book is heavily slanted towards the Brazilian viewpoint.
While this is to be expected, the scholarship would have been stronger had Dávila
made greater use of sources from the United States and especially from Africa.
Without this perspective the reader is left wondering how the United States
viewed Brasilia’s attempt to break out from its shadow to pursue an independent
foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa and what, if anything, Washington did to
try to prevent this. More importantly, I would have liked to have known more
about how Africans perceived Brazilian attempts to re-orient their foreign policy
towards their continent. It would have been particularly illuminating to know
how eﬀective Africans felt white Brazilian diplomats were in trying to self-identify
themselves as culturally “African.” These minor critiques aside, Dávila should be
applauded for this scholarly achievement.

Dr. Phil E. Muehlenbeck
Visiting & Part-Time Faculty
George Washington University
Washington, D.C.
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Anyanwu, Ogechi E. The Politics of Access: University
Education and Nation-Building in Nigeria, 1948-1960.
Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011, xvi + 298 pp.
Education is central to nation-building in Africa. The huge investment in mass
education from the era of decolonization by African leaders and policy makers
found expression in the pivotal role it is capable of playing in the development
of the human and material capital of the continent. However, access to mass
education did not take place overnight. Indeed, until the demise of colonial
rule, higher education was only available to very few and remained largely
an elitist project. In The Politics of Access, Ogechi Anyanwu, tackles for the first
time, the history of the transition of higher education from an elitist project to a
populist one. According to Anyanwu, the push for mass university education, i.e.
massification, “is central to understanding Nigeria’s postcolonial socio-economic
and political history” (1). Anyanwu argues that the “the premise of building a
modern Nigerian nation underscored the pursuit of mass university education
policies by Nigeria’s successive postcolonial governments” (1). Although a lot of
books have been written on Nigeria’s education history covering the colonial and
postcolonial periods, none has tackled the change and continuity in the politics of
access to higher education.
This brilliantly written seven-chapter book is organized chronologically to
demonstrate how political and economic transformation since the period of colonial
rule has influenced the politics of access to higher education and the character of
each regime and individuals involved. Chapter one engages some familiar history
of the introduction of Western education, and the nexus between colonialism
and education policy, to contextualize the chapters that follow. Anyanwu gives a
penetrating analysis of the role missionaries played in the introduction of education
from the 1840s when mission schools were first introduced to southern Nigeria
and the disposition of the colonial government to it. Although Western education
helped the missionaries and the British colonial government to produce clerks and
clergies for their religious and administrative work, the British government did
not want it to be accessible to everyone. This double standard reflected the British
conviction that the training of highly educated colonial subjects was detrimental
to colonial hegemony. According to Anyanwu the education provided by the
missionaries was “not relevant to the immediate needs of the people.” But this
prejudice towards education was not left unchallenged from the second half of the
nineteenth century as leading African nationalists began to criticize the British for
not doing enough to fulfil its mission to “civilize” Nigeria through Western-styled
education.
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In response to this criticism, the British, as Anynawu points out, established
Yaba Higher College in 1934 to give Nigerians clerical and vocational training
to meet the lower cadre of oﬃcials for the colonial service. But the nationalists
would soon criticize Yaba because its graduates were rated as inferior to their
counterparts trained outside the country. Moreover, access to the college was
very restricted to very few “qualified” candidates. Fifteen years after Yaba was
establish, the University College of Ibadan (UCI, later University of Ibadan) came
into existence though local and international pressure on the government which
continued to pay a lip service to higher education for Nigerians. But like the Yaba,
the UCI, as Anyanwu demonstrates was an elitist project which instead of helping
to address the long-standing problems of higher education and access, added new
crises to the ethnic conflagration in the country.
After presenting the much-required information about higher education, its
restrictiveness and as a tool of imperialism, and the early move by Nigerians to
force the British to revise its curriculum to serve the needs of Nigerians, Anyanwu
then begins to carefully plough through the postcolonial phase of the politics of
access to university training. Chapters two and three focus on the nexus between
decolonization and the critical role that education was capable of playing in
nation building. According to Anyanwu, the constitutional arrangement in 1954
that gave birth to regionalization played a significant role in creating a new era of
massification of education as the governments of each of the regions, following the
recommendation of Ashby Commission set up in 1959 to “help chart the course
for the country’s educational expansion,” began to make the provision of higher
education as a significant element towards the drive for regional development.
In these two chapters, Anyanwu devotes quality space and deep analyses to the
numerous sentiments expressed by Nigerian nationalists and political leaders
at federal and states levels about the need to use education to transform their
polities. By 1962, Anyanwu notes that four new universities founded by regional
governments of eastern, western, and northern Nigeria had been established to
address education imbalances and the limited access that the UCI oﬀered.
The end of the Civil War in the 1970s coincided with the unprecedented
increase in Nigerian foreign exchange earnings through crude oil, as Anyanwu
shows in chapter 4. The massive investment in university education during the
1970s found expression in the Gowon’s drive to heal the wounds of hostility
through increase in education opportunities needed to close the gap of educational
achievement between the north and the south. Unlike in the 1960s when university
education was deeply regionalized, the centralization of university education in
the 1970s was a strategic tool to accelerate and forge greater national integration
in an extremely polarized society. Anyanwu clearly pontificates that the new
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universities of the 1970s and the old regional ones were expected to give new
meanings to Nigeria’s unity, while also helping to address the age-long problems
of limited opportunity to higher education. Although this expansion fulfilled
some of the core agenda of the three military administrations in the 1970s, access
to university education remained elusive in a country of over 68 million people in
1968.
Anyanwu dedicates two chapters to the exploration of changes and
continuity in the politics of education in the 1980s. New developments such as
the provision of free education, the involvement of state governments in higher
education, introduction of a quota system, and the transformation of university
curricula to emphasize the governments’ quest to industrialize the country through
science, were among the numerous steps taken to increase Nigerians’ access to
higher education while attempting to balance long standing problems of ethnic
division that characterizes the Nigerian states. But as Anyanwu demonstrates, the
economic crises in the 1980s compelled the government to suspend the expansion
of university education as it struggled to maintain the existing ones. The final
chapter of this book tackles the developments in the 1990s, characterized by the
resumption of an expansion of university education though the establishment of
specialized universities of science and agriculture. The 1990s also witnessed the
emergence of private universities that most people believed would reduce pressure
on government universities and help increase Nigerians’ access to quality higher
education.
In all, Anyanwu has done a great service to Africanist studies with this book.
He has given us a book that connects education to broader challenges of nationbuilding and the endless quest to balance the numerous primordial interests in the
country. By connecting the history of access to education with broader challenges
of nation-building, Anyanwu has helped validate the popular rhetoric that
education is a significant factor in Africa’s drive towards sustainable development.
His sources, which include reports by local and international policy organization,
leading educationists, military and civilians leaders, among other classes of highly
influential people, are qualitatively and quantitatively adequate for a work of this
scope—even though the gap is the author’s inability to integrate more voices of
“ordinary” Nigerians on access to university education.

Dr. Saheed Aderinto
Assistant Professor of History
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee NC.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Book Reviews | 47

Arnfred, Signe. Sexuality and Gender Politics in
Mozambique: Rethinking Gender in Africa. Suﬀolk,
United Kingdom: James Currey, 2011, ix + 310 pp.
Are women oppressed in the same way around the world? Are feminists correct
to assume that men universally discriminate against women? Sexuality and Gender
Politics in Mozambique is an opportunity to re-conceptualize Western feminist
analysis and theory. The author explains that during the Second Wave of feminism
in the 1970s, Western feminists did not think “that gender relations might be
diﬀerent elsewhere in the world, and that we could possibly learn about diﬀerent,
more balanced gender relations, by studying other cultures” (10). After reading
the criticisms of Western feminism by African gender studies scholars, Arnfred
concludes that Western scholarship partriarchalized African cultures. The book
is her eﬀort to provide a new way of examining and understanding gender and
sexuality, using the Mozambiquan context as an example.
The book began more than 30 years ago after Arnfred heard the first president
of Mozambique, Samora Machel, speak on the necessity of women’s liberation in
1975. She worked and lived in Mozambique in the 1980s. She returned in the 1990s
and 2000s to collect data and participate in several academic, professional, and social
events in the country. This book is presented in three parts, with an introduction
and epilogue. Using observations and interviews, the author discusses gender and
sexuality in Mozambique from the perspective and experiences of people in the
rural areas. She also describes and reflects on her mental journey regarding gender
and sexuality.
The first part of the book has five chapters and explores the policies,
assumptions, and interpretations that guided gender politics in Mozambique since
the colonial period. In chapter one, Arnfred tells the story of Mozambican women’s
participation in the struggle for independence. The women’s accounts here add a
fascinating, and sometimes comical, dimension to the book. The events and issues
that defined and redefined gender and sexuality in Mozambique underscores the
importance of considering historical, social, and economic contexts in examining
and understanding diﬀerent societies. It is a true strength to hear these women tell
their stories in their own words as few African studies have “her-stories.”
In part two, which also has five chapters, Arnfred explores a subject that
fascinated her during her time in Mozambique – women’s initiation rituals. She
states that the sojourn enabled her to find meanings and interpretations for these
rituals to understand the women and herself. Initially, she had interpreted the
ritual as humiliating and oppressive. However, when she conceptualized it this
way for the women, it meant something else to them. For the women, the initiation
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ceremony was “about the creation of women” (145). In Mozambique, under the
light of the moon, girls become women, not through physical and biological
changes, but through “tests, trials, dances, performances and passing-on of secret
knowledge” (145). Focusing on this lesser known and probably misunderstood
custom in this way allowed the author to re-conceptualize/interpret the initiation
ritual as an empowering tradition. Chapter 10 is a really helpful tool here. In it,
the author discusses gender from the perspectives of Nigerian gender scholars
like Oyèrónké Oyewùmí, Ifi Amadiume, and Nkiru Nzegwu. She applies their
arguments to the discussion to facilitate or aid one’s re-conceptualizations of gender
and sexuality. For instance, the section titled “situational gender,” emphasizes
gender as a fluid concept. The term “woman” is presented as being overloaded
“with implications and associations which are irrelevant and disturbing in African
contexts” (205). This chapter has information to reframe the issue of womanhood
in feminist scholarship.
Part three of the book has four chapters and here, Arnfred examines other
issues. In chapter 11, one reads of male mythologies, chapter 12 of gendered
power and land ownership, and chapter 13 of sex, food, and female power. This
part could be described as the “fun” part of the book as one learns more about
Mozambique’s cultures and traditions. Some of the topics are also regionally
or ethnically contextualized. For instance, while northern Mozambique is
matrilineal, southern Mozambique is patrilineal. Since little research exists on
matrilineal societies in Africa, this part is a refreshing addition to the book. More
importantly, it documents this issue from a political, economic, historical, and
spiritual perspective. This part will definitely add to the discourse on issues like
empowerment and development projects as it requires one to recognize the place
and role of men and women.
Overall, Sexuality and Gender Politics in Mozambique does a wonderful job of
providing an opportunity to see the subject matter from another standpoint. The
author succeeds in her goal of challenging the reader to see gender and sexuality
in a new way. However, the author sometimes generalizes her arguments and
findings about Mozambique to Africa as a whole. When one wants others to
contextualize gender and sexuality, why still believe that what pertains to
Mozambique pertains to the entire continent? This ties in with the use of the term
empirical to describe the data. Empirical suggests that the information observed or
found is true. However, like all things human, empirical data is also influenced by
previous beliefs. While one must applaud her eﬀorts to be objective in her analysis
of certain issues, there were times when criticism was called for.

Dr. Aje-Ori Agbese
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Vansina, Jan. Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in
Rural Congo, 1880-1960. Wisconsin: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 2010, v + 342 pp.
Scholars are increasingly paying attention to the complex, diverse, and shared
colonial experiences of various African peoples and societies. In Being Colonized,
Jan Vansina retraces the colonial life of the Kuba people and argues that a focus
on the people’s “shared experiences bring[s] us closer than any other approach
to a concrete understanding of what life was actually like in that colonial period”
(328). As he shows in the book, the process by which the Congo became a
Belgium colony was long; it followed decades of exploring Africa which saw King
Leopold creating an international African association and sponsoring numerous
expeditions to the central African region. The Congo was colonized shortly after
the conclusion of the Berlin Conference on February 23, 1885. Governed initially
by Belgium’s absolute ruler, King Leopold II, and later taken over by the Belgian
government following a media campaign against Leopold’s atrocities that E.D.
Morel championed, Congo grew “eighty times larger than its metropolis” (18).
According to the author, this feat was achieved because Belgium “was the second
biggest industrial power in Europe, a power equal to that of the United States” (1819). Being Colonized is a comprehensive account of the people’s engagement with
the complex and dynamic colonial structures, exploring the mostly destructive
social, political, and economic transformation resulting from Belgian colonial rule.
As the author reveals in the book, the relationship between European
administrators, missionaries, traders, explorers, and the Kuba throughout the
colonial period was unequal. It was a relationship that was “backed by force, but
ultimately did not rest on force” (4). The author analyzes the social and economic
devastation that followed the conquest of the kingdom by the Compagnie du
Kasai, a concession company of the Congo Free State, the wealth and suﬀering that
rubber brought to Belgian and Kuba respectively, the exploitative administrative
tactics employed to exploit the people — driven, of course, by the mindless pursuit
of profit and revenue by colonial oﬃcials. According to the author, “it was not
the trading of rubber by itself that somehow brought destruction with it, but the
combination of a commercial monopoly allied to a complete abdication of any
oversight by the state” (85).
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Vansina reveals in the book that both the 1910 decree on the indirect rule system
of governance and the 1917 decree on compulsory labor considerably reshaped the
history of colonial Kuba. Aided eﬀectively by the Kuba, Belgian colonial oﬃcials
“decided what kinds of crops over what acreage each adult male villager was
compelled to grow,” and, worst still was that the dehumanization, high deaths
rates, and punishments following non-compliance was such that “by the 1950s
about one of every ten men spent time in jail each year and that most men had
done so at one time or another” (215). Although the colonial authorities believed
that the economic pressure visited upon the Kuba would result in “development,”
the author preferred to use the word “exploitation” to characterize the reality of
the Kuba colonial experience. “By the end of colonial rule practically,” the author
insists, “no Kuba village was better oﬀ than when the era began. . . . Surely, had
they known the word, the villagers would not have called this development but
rather the contrary: underdevelopment” (243).
The uniqueness of this book derives from the author’s ability to weave
interviews of elders, local news, gossip, and dreams in reconstructing the
colonial experiences of the people. This bottom-up approach is largely missing
in Eurocentric writings about African history. The author’s anticipated hopes for
this book is well placed. According to him, if the book “manages to capture the
imagination and the interests of most if its readers, and thereby raises greater
understanding, awareness, and perhaps sympathy for the lives of Congolese
then and now, it will not have been written nor read in vain” (331). Anyone who
thoughtfully reads this book will agree that the author realized his hope.
No historical account will adequately put into words the brutalities with
which European colonists treated Africans during the colonial rule. Congo’s
mistreatment, both in the hands of the notorious King Leopold II and the Belgium
government arguably raised European barbarism against innocent Africans to a
frightening level. That the European colonial powers have not fully acknowledged
or compensated for the crimes they committed against colonial subjects is
inconceivable. Movements to seek redress for colonial injustices have continued,
however. For instance, after many years of legal wrangling, the ruling of the
United Kingdom’s High Court in 2012 permitted Kenyans to seek legal redress
for colonial-era abuses. Britain opted to settle out of court in 2013, providing $30.5
million in compensation to 5,200 victims. The British Foreign Secretary, William
Hague, expressed regret over what he described as “abhorrent violations of human
dignity” committed more than fifty years ago by his country.1 This landmark case,
1
James Reinl, “Kenyans Celebrate Mau Mau Compensation Win,”Aljazeera,
June 7, 2013, accessed August 30, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2013/06/201366133052307633.html.
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I hope, will not only open a doorway to similar claims by millions of Africans who
suﬀered unimaginable crimes in the hands of colonial oﬃcials but also open the
minds of former colonial governments of the inevitability of acknowledging their
past wrongs in the interest of justice which they so often promote. This is critical
for, according to Paul Muite, a lawyer for the Mau Mau veterans, “If we are going
to end impunity around the globe, each nation, each person, must acknowledge
their wrongdoing.”2
The author’s neglect to cite most of the primary sources he used in the book is
not an ideal example of how historians should write. Further, although the author
argues that the atrocities committed against the Kuba “are far from the whole
story of colonial Congo” (58), his book clearly demonstrates that those atrocious
crimes unquestionably remain at the core of any meaningful understanding of
the country’s colonial and post-colonial economic, political, and social tragedies.
That notwithstanding, this book serves as a reminder that colonial abuses, far from
being exhausted, continue to be explored in diﬀerent ways by historians. Suited for
scholars, graduate students, and general readers eager to understand the enduring
impact of colonial exploitative policies and practices on African societies, this book
is highly sophisticated and intellectually stimulating; it is sure to make a great
impression in the field of history and international relations.

Dr. Ogechi E. Anyanwu
Associate Professor of History
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY.

2

Ibid.
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Bruder, Edith, ed. The Black Jews of Africa: History,
Religion, Identity. Oxford: University Press, 2011, xii +
283 pp.
The past couple of decades have seen a rising interest in scholarly discourses
on Jewish Diasporas although the wider global trend is yet to be adequately
covered in mainstream African studies and African Diaspora studies. Much of
this lacuna may be attributed to the eminent Nigerian historian, Adiele E. Afigbo,
who on the strength of his works on the Igbo, authoritatively branded related
studies connecting Igbo origins to Jewish descent as a desperate search for “noble
ancestry.”3 Thus, in spite of Afigbo, Edith Bruder’s The Black Jews of Africa is a
courageous adventure in migration history, cultural crossbreeding, and identity
formation. Africans have come upon Jewish tradition and legends in diverse
circumstances and contexts. Gradually, some African groups have used these to
articulate a new Jewish identity joined with that of the Diaspora. Bruder’s book
is therefore a timely rebirth of this field of scholarship; it presents readers with a
solid narrative situated in a transnational context. The author perceptively reflects
on the complex strands of evidence tending to connect both the sub-Saharan
“African Jews” and their “cousins” in China, India, Middle East, Europe, and
North America with their supposed motherland in Palestine.
Being one of the very few recent studies to track the dispersion of Jews
continent-wide, the vast scope of coverage and methodological approach is one
of the distinguishing markers of Bruder’s work. The ten chapters of the book
are chronologically and thematically organized in three parts with an absorbing
“Epilogue.” I consider Part One (Chapters 1-4), which explores the prehistory of
the Jewish settlements on the continent, an outstanding coverage of migration,
ethnicity, and political identity formation. Evidently, Bruder struggled to winnow
through Biblical prophesies, hearsays, myths, and legends that have followed
the trail of the globetrotting Jews across diverse times and geographical spaces.
Among the most popular myths linked with the so-called “Lost Tribe of Israel” are
the Solomon and Queen of Sheba love fest, the Biblical children of Kush, and the
Western-fabled depiction of Ethiopia and Africa as the homeland of a ghostly noble
man identified by fifteenth century Portuguese fortune hunters as Prester John.
As the author points out, “Biblical narratives and prophesies that mentioned the
putative existence of Jews in the land of Kush (i.e. Africa) provided the scriptural
foundations for subsequent complex connections between Jews and Africa” (17).
Part two (chapters 5-7) details the variety of connections between Judaism
3
See Adiele E. Afigbo, Igbo History and Society: The Essays of Adiele Afigbo, ed. Toyin Falola
(Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 2005), 8-9.
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and blackness. The foci of discussion in chapters 5 and 6 is the development, in
Western accounts, of Jews and blacks as the archetypal “Other” whose “discovery
and invention reinforced and perhaps established the notion of Europe by focusing
on it and surrounding it with a strange periphery” (37). This construction of
otherness gained popular acclaim in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as Europeans in Africa tried to force their thoughts and ways of life into the heads
and minds of Africans. Bruder methodically runs a reality check on the role
played by the early European missionaries, soldiers, and scholars—particularly
the anthropologists such as M. D. Jeﬀreys, and Thomas Basden and others—who
in the idiom of now discredited Hamitic hypothesis, saw the vision of outside
influences, particularly Jewish ones, in every significant cultural element existing
in Africa. Bruder provides the reader with a very rare insight into the motives
behind such colonial inventions and how these ideological interjections interacted
with their local African sub-strata to create new projections that were appropriated
and popularized by black thinkers like Edward W. Blyden, James Africanus
Horton, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, to mention but four, whose writings and
speeches were primarily aimed to dismiss the European-held notion that people of
African descent were inferior (39-77).
Part three (chapters 8-10) articulates a historical account of Jewish
influences in sub-Saharan Africa. As Bruder stated in chapter 8, the penchant for
“genealogical dreams” have seen several African societies “stage their arrival in
Africa through elements of an original “otherness” (97). Chapters 9 and 10 detail
a number of African groups that have self-identified as Jews. These communities
range from the widely known Ethiopians and Igbos, to the lesser known Zakhor
of Mali, Balula Jews of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Lembe found
in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the Jews of Rusape found in Zambia, the Tutsi
of Rwanda and Burundi, the Kasuku of Kenya, and the Abayudaya of Uganda.
Of particular interest are the motivations that led these ethnic groups in western,
eastern, central, and southern regions of the continent to assert Jewish genealogy.
Among other things, these groups wanted to connect kinships with the Patriarch
Abraham, identified in the Holy Bible as the chosen friend of God Almighty (161185).
The epilogue “Ancient Myths and Modern Phenomenon” is a summary of
the various catalysts broadly explaining the political, economic, and sociocultural
magnets that prompted the rise of these mythical-genealogical connects and their
interjections with the Judo-Christian ideology. The pertinent question remains:
why is it that this particular period of African history should witness a rebirth
of Judaizing movements and which factors should be taken into consideration to
understand their dynamics? In answer, the author concludes that critical “social
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and technological developments” have given the various groups self-identifying
as “African Jews” new opportunities and encouragement in forms of websites and
access to rare books and periodicals now helping researchers to chase further this
rather romantic idea of godly ancestry (188).
Overall, Bruder’s new book has reopened an interesting topic that both
students of transnational studies and ethnic politics will want to explore further.
Although it did not break the bank in answering most of the lingering questions
on the authenticity of Afro-Jewish kinship, I strongly urge those interested in
Diaspora studies in general and African and Jewish studies in particularly to read
The Black Jews of Africa.

Dr. Raphael Chijioke Njoku
Associate Professor of History
Idaho State University
Pocatello, ID.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Book Reviews | 55

Allina, Eric. Slavery by Any Other Name: African
Life under Company Rule in Colonial Mozambique.
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012, xiii
+ 255 pp.
In Slavery by Any Other Name, Eric Allina gives an impressive account of life in
Mozambique during the time of its colonization by Portugal. Mozambique is
historically significant largely because it had the most extensive as well as the
longest Portuguese colonial presence in Africa. Allina’s argument that the
Mozambican colonial experience was not fundamentally diﬀerent from that which
had prevailed elsewhere in colonial Africa pales in the face of the magnitude,
length, and dominance of the conscripted or forced labor system adopted by the
Portuguese administration, especially in the Manica and Sofala territories. Allina
uses oﬃcial documents and records from the long-lost and unexplored colonial
archive as well as interviews from more than one hundred surviving Mozambicans
to gain an understanding of both the process and consequences of colonization
and forced labor for Mozambique. These documents reveal the depth of colonial
brutality, the ideologies that informed the Portuguese colonial attitude towards
Africans, the complex and calculated process through which company oﬃcials
and colonial administrators negotiated and sustained colonial policies, the impact
of forced labor on African lives and the various strategies Africans used to subvert
colonial policies.
The book is divided into eight chapters, with substantial introductory and
concluding chapters. The chapters oﬀer progressive accounts of the substance
and length of the colonial servitude imposed upon the Mozambicans, which
Allina unequivocally defines as enslavement for the benefit of the white settler
populations who required both local knowledge of agriculture and labor to farm
and sustain the cultivation of maize and, then cotton, and also hut taxes from
the inhabitants of the region to fund the colonial administration. Allina argues
that while slave masters in South Carolina’s rice plantations or Jamaica’s sugar
plantations were unpretentious about their slave dealing enterprise, colonial
oﬃcials in Mozambique “camouflaged their coercion of Africans behind the legal
fiction of ‘contracts’…The Portuguese administrators who oversaw subcontracted
slave labor claimed that compelling Africans to work [for the benefit of empire],
‘by force if necessary,’ would improve their moral and material well-being” (6).
Chapter one traces the history of Portugal’s settlement in southeast Africa,
heralded by the arrival of Vasco da Gama and his crew on the east coast of Africa
in 1498, on their way to India. By the end of the sixteenth century, Portugal had
shifted its attention to the interiors of south-central Africa, famed for its abundance
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of gold. Although met with malaria and fierce resistance by the locals, by midnineteenth century, Portugal would succeed in establishing its colonial stronghold
in Mozambique, clothed in its two-pronged rhetoric of “suppressing slavery” in
the African hinterlands and “civilizing the blacks.” For Portugal, this process of
“civilizing Africans” was conducted through forced or conscripted labor. As the
author notes, “Africans in Mozambique—and, indeed, all ‘natives’ throughout
the Portuguese empire—were required to work for a period of time required by
local authorities” (33). “Work” for the African was defined as forced labor in vast
estates owned by white farmers for little or no pay for a period of six out of twelve
months, with inadequate shelter, insuﬃcient food, and little or no medical care.
Chapter two documents the vastness and brutality of the forced labor
practices in Mozambique during the colonial period. According to Allina, “the
territory’s enormous demand for African labor, employers’ unwillingness to pay
wages suﬃcient to draw voluntary workers, the company’s political and financial
investment in the concession-holder’s success, and the near-total autonomy of
local administrators all meant that there was little to stand in the way of pervasive
enslavement of the African population” (47). And, contrary to the colonial rhetoric
of forced work as needed to improve and advance Africans, many reports point to
the opposite eﬀect. The inhumane treatment of the Mozambicans led to the death
of many, as well as the impoverishment of African communities deprived of much
needed labor since their most abled and skilled men were conscripted to work for
the colonial government and Portuguese owned farms, even during the planting
seasons.
In Chapter three, Allina documents the failure of the League of Nations to
eﬀectively address the question of contract or forced labor (slavery) when the
issue was brought before it during the early part of the twentieth century. Neither
the 1924 nor the 1930 Convention of Slavery succeeded in curtailing forced or slave
labor, primarily because those charged with evaluating the question and drafting
the resolutions consisted of colonial agents who themselves were well aware of
European reliance on forced labor in colonial Africa and, hence, were unwilling
to oppose it. Chapters four and five deftly tackle the challenges of forced labor
and the various tactics employed by locals to subvert and circumvent colonial
policies of enslaving Africans in their own homelands. Tactics included “melting”
or disappearing into the hills, flights and border crossings. Since these strategies
resulted in the loss of labor and tax revenues for the colonial government, the
Portuguese countered by instituting laws and practices to limit freedom of
movement and other forms of resistance. Oﬀenders received punishment that
ranged from brutal flogging to unpaid forced correctional labor for up to forty
years. Rebellions were squelched decisively and with terrorizing force. Services
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of chiefs in recruiting and maintaining conscripted labor were obtained either
through force, intimidation, or voluntary compliance due to fear of reprisal.
In chapters six, seven, and eight, Allina traces the political and social
impact of forced servitude on African lives in the Mozambique. Forced labor did
not only relegate Africans to the positions of slaves in their own country, but it
also eﬀectively thwarted the precolonial political relations that had existed in
the communities. The heavy reliance on able men for conscription undermined
traditional respect for elders who were now deemed “weak” and “useless” in their
customary role as protectors of the youth and the community. The tendency of
older men to oﬀer up their young in order to avoid slavery severely damaged the
communal system of support by which elders nurtured and groomed the youth,
and the youth respected the elders in return. If the elders lacked integrity to protect
the youth, the youth felt they could no longer rely on the elders to protect them.
The narrative Allina provides in Slavery by Any Other Name is a bit redundant,
and the focus of the book is rather narrow. Exploring primarily how oﬃcial
documents illuminate the complex ideologies and influences that initiated and
helped sustain Portugal’s extensive forced labor systems in Africa, the book
neglects to examine the roles Africans played in helping to extricate themselves
from the clutches of colonial slavery and exploitation. Allina does suggest that an
essential aspect of the narrative is its inclusion of African voices and reflections on
their experiences. But, those perspectives focus largely on general disgust for forced
labor, complaints, and strategies used to withstand oppression. The narrative fails
to address the nature, extent and roles played by the nationalistic movements that
eventually won independence for Mozambique in 1975, and, hence, eﬀectively
ended Portuguese direct rule and the forced labor system. Additionally, the book’s
concluding chapter raises more questions than it addresses. The chapter oﬀers
cursory mention of the role of the Christian missionaries in colonial Mozambique
as well as the negative impact of colonial legacies on post-independence
Mozambique’s economic and political policies and practices. Mentioning these
pivotal topics in the conclusion, without adequate examination, is problematic.
For instance, it is never clear if the missionaries had been there all along during the
colonial regime, serving as both agents and critiques of empire, or if they became
a later introduction as Portuguese colonial rule began to wane in the 1960s and
1970s.
Nonetheless, despite its weaknesses, Slavery by Any Other Name is useful
in placing the story of Mozambique within the larger framework of African
colonial history. In spite of the substantial existing scholarship on the European
colonization of the African continent, the depth and extent of the phenomenon and
its impact on the African experience are yet to be fully explored or understood. This
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book draws attention to that fact. The recovery of the Mozambique’s Company’s
colonial archives might also prove useful, as Allina suggests, in assisting scholars
to uncover the relatively still unknown biographies of the men who helped
perpetrate such atrocities on Africa and its peoples, and their larger role in Africa’s
colonial history.

Dr. Salome C. Nnoromele
Professor of English
Director of African & African American Studies
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY.
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Honwana, Alcinda. The Time of Youth: Work, Social
Change, and Politics in Africa. Sterling, VA: Kumarian
Press, 2012, xiv + 222 pp.
In The Time of Youth, anthropologist Alcinda Honwana focuses on youth
experiences of what she terms waithood, that is that prolonged stage between
childhood and adulthood, a phenomenon resulting from failed neoliberal and
global socioeconomic and political crises. Organized around eight chapters, this
book tells a very coherent story of how youth that are undergoing the prevailing
challenges of globalization are seeking “creative” ways of managing their lives.
In articulating this story, Honwana focuses on the phenomenon of waithood and
argues that it encompasses the lives of the majority of young Africans regardless of
where they live. It shows that the class dimension provides an important window
through which to understand the experiences of youth in the global south. But she
also notes that despite the constraints youth face, waithood is both creative and
transformative. Using data collected from Mozambique, South Africa, Senegal,
and Tunisia, Honwana does a good job of providing useful historical contexts of
these countries that allow readers to understand her arguments without losing the
ethnographic narrative.
In chapter one, Honwana frames her book within existing studies of youth,
and defines youth and waitood before providing historical contexts of the four
African countries on which she focuses and the interconnectedness of the stories of
their youth. In the second chapter, she expands on her use of the phenomenon of
waithhood as it aﬀects not only youth in Africa but also in developed countries. In
chapters three and four, we respectively get an analysis of the specific aspirations
youth have as they face the challenges of waithood and the coping mechanisms
they apply. Chapter five focuses on sexuality and intimacy as new ways of coping
with waithood. Honwana then provides an analysis of how youth reject oldfashioned party politics (chapter 6) through social movements that bring about
social change in Tunisia (chapter 7) and the ways that waithood is assuming a
global phenomenon that aﬀects youth in Madrid, London, New York, and Dakar,
among other global locations (chapter 8).
Honwana writes well and is able to balance theory with ethnographic data
that she gathered in the field while acknowledging and engaging with vast strands
of literature on the topic. Her analysis of waithood is centered on experiences of
African youth but she is also able to show both its particularities and similarities
with other continents and varied ways youth respond to it. Some of the common
strategies for coping with waithood include: “border crossing,” exemplified by the
physical crossing of national borders for immigrants from Guinea trying to eke a
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living on the streets of Dakar, Senegal; young women traders bringing goods into
Mozambique from South Africa and trying to pay as little tax as possible or none
at all; and Senegalese youth crossing through the Mediterranean Sea to Europe
in search of greener pastures. There are youth also who are living in waithood
despite being in formal work, as is the case of young Tunisian young females
Honwana interviewed who were working in European telemarketing call centers
located in Tunisia that hire university graduates to meet customer relations needs
for the European market. Outside of these coping strategies employed by youth
in both informal and formal sectors, Honwana devotes a chapter on intimacy, a
phenomenon that entails the reconfiguration of masculine and feminine identities.
Men who traditionally have had power over women because of their ability to
provide materially now cannot project such masculine identities because their
economic instability does not allow them to be “real men.” As a result, Honwana
argues that because unemployed young men in waithood lack the economic
advantage that employed men have over women, sexual power becomes the
only tool left to them (102). On the other hand, young women through intimate
relations with multiple men strategically engineer sexual relationships to achieve
their goals and maximize their gains (93). Further, by ensuring that the material
benefits of sexual engagements do not come from a single man who could exercise
control over them, these women try to guarantee their relative independence.
There are two other discussions that Honwana makes that are very important
in understanding youth in Africa today—citizenship and social change. Regarding
citizenship, Honwana shows that youth have rejected formal party politics
but have rallied behind movements that seek to right the social ills caused by
corruption, bad governance, failed political promises, and other administrative
challenges. Here Honwana provides examples of youth engagement in hiphop music that challenge the status quo and of social movements that change
political arrangements as happened in Senegal and Tunisia. In this way, Honwana
confronts traditional theories of citizenship that tended to understand it as the
gradual (and passive) acquisition of civil, political, and social rights. The stories
that she provides of youth across Africa show that rights are not a given but rather
something that youth have to fight for, which leads to an approach to rights that
encompasses both rights and participation.
Finally, Honwana shows that youth do not just participate in social
movements but also bring about much needed social change. By providing a
detailed account of the processes that led to Tunisia’s political change, including the
careful coalition that youth were able to form with workers, politicians, and other
social groups, Honwana shows what it takes for youth social movements to bring
about change. When Tunisian youth’s desire for social change became relevant to
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the broader spectrum of Tunisia’s population, Tunisian youth were able to bring
about the fall of Ben Ali’s regime. Although this book is engaging, repeating some
information in diﬀerent chapters is unhelpful. Nonetheless, anyone working on
issues of youth in both in Africa in particular and other continents in general will
find this book useful.

Dr. Mwenda Ntarangwi
Associate Professor of Anthropology
Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI.
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Yewah, Emmanuel and Dimeji Togunde, eds. Across
the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States
Diaspora. Illinois: Common Ground, 2010, vii + 174 pp.
Although the total number of African immigrants in the United States is not as
large as other immigrant groups, they have increased substantially over the years.
According to the U.S. Census, of the 37,961,000 foreign-born population in the
U.S. in 2008, 20,150,000 were from Latin America; 10,356,000 from Asia; 4,969,000
from Europe; and 1,436,000 from Africa. In 1960, there were only 35,000 African
immigrants in the United States. Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the
United States Diaspora edited by Emmanuel Yewah and Dimeji Togunde, has made
an important contribution to the understanding of the new African Diaspora in
the United States. According Yewah and Togunde, “pre-migration characteristics
such as media and literary representation of the United States, socialization
experiences including exposure to oral traditions, religious identity and pluralism
which become important tools for immigrants to cope and to navigate through
the complexities of their new society have received little or no attention in the
literature”(3).
Before reading this book, I expected to find answers to the following seven
questions: (1) How many African immigrants have emigrated to the U.S. in the
post-World War II era and what countries are they from?; (2) What are the factors
that caused them to emigrate to the U.S.?; (3) What are the educational, social
and economic characteristics of these new African immigrants in the U.S.?; (4)
Are there negative implications to Africa for losing this highly selected group of
emigrants?; (5) Are there benefits to Africa due to this “brain drain,” or do they
maintain connections with their homelands?; (6) How do they adapt and cope
in their new communities in the U.S.? Or do they maintain their ethnic/racial,
religious/spiritual, and class identities?; What are their settlement patterns?; and
(7) What is their impact on the host society?
The nine chapters of this book did an excellent scholarly job answering all
of the above questions. For example, chapters one, two, three and five answered
questions one and two; chapters four, five, six, and eight answered questions three
and six; and chapters seven and nine answered questions four and five.
While answering all of these important questions, many interesting
interrelated sub-themes emerged out of the book under the central theme of culture:
culture as ethnicity or language; culture as religion; culture as food; culture as
home community development (remittances for school fees, food, house building,
etc.); culture as internet use; culture as political participation in homeland aﬀairs;
or culture as media (newspapers, television, movies) and literature (books and
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public intellectual publications).
Pertaining to culture as ethnicity or language, Anthony A. Olorunnisola
presents useful information in chapter six on how ethnic/linguistic characteristics
tend to remain permanent. He shows that just as ethnicity plays a central role in
relations in Africa, it also plays a central role in the lives of African immigrants in
their assimilation and pluralism experiences in the U.S.: “we argue that African
émigrés enter the United States more specifically as Ogonis or Hausas (of Nigeria);
as Hutus or Tutsis (of Rwanda); as Afrikaners or Zulus (of South Africa)” (105).
Connecting this to religion, Emmanuel K. Twesigye also notes in chapter 8 how
Christian or Muslim African immigrants in the U.S. would establish their own
Churches or Mosques, and that “some Africans wanted to establish their own
churches and mosques in order to serve as the leaders and determine their liturgy,
language and preaching style as well as the topics and cultural or moral content of
the sermons” (139-140).
In chapter seven, Ayokunle Olumuyiwa Omobowale, Mofeyisara Oluwatoyin
Omobowale and Olawale Olufolahan Ajani present useful information about the
rapid increase in the amount of remittances to Africa, which are now more than
foreign aid from the West, and they reveal the various economic, educational, and
social benefits to family members and communities in African nations. However,
in chapter nine Okechukwu Iheduru explains the diﬃculty that Africans in the
Diaspora are experiencing from political leaders in their home countries in attaining
dual citizenship and voting rights at home. As a result, African immigrants
find themselves not attaining U.S. citizenship because it could cost them their
citizenship at home, but they also tend not to run for political oﬃce in the U.S. due
to the same lack of citizenship. On January 16, 2011, Jeremy Hay wrote an article
in the Press Democrat about a rare development whereby a Nigerian immigrant
banker, Amy Ahanotu, in California won a seat on the Rohnert Park City Council.1
One visible limitation of the book is the lack of information on non-black
African immigrants in the U.S. and how they relate to their black counterparts.
Bridget Teboh notes in chapter five that 23 percent of the 881,300 African
immigrants in the U.S. in 2000 were categorized as white and that “the end of
apartheid in South Africa and Zimbabwe appears to count for the presence of
white Africans” (80-81). Another group of Africans also categorized as white in
the U.S. is Arabs with hair texture and skin color such as those of the prominent
Lebanese American, Ralph Nader. But as Amadu Kaba points out, the late black
president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, is categorized as black in the U.S., just as the
1
Jeremy Hay, “Rohnert Park Councilman’s Journey from Civil War to Civic Role,” The Press
Democrat, January 16, 2011, accessed February 19, 2011,
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/article/20110116/ARTICLES/110119598.
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leader of Egypt and Commander in Chief of the Egyptian military from February
2011 to June 2012, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, is considered a black
man in the U.S., but his immediate predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, is seen as a white
man.2 Two of the three leaders of Egypt since the 1970s are considered both black
men and Arabs, Arab being their culture. Anthony A. Olorunnisola discusses this
racial categorization belief system of white Americans in chapter six (108-109).
Across the Atlantic: African Immigrants in the United States Diaspora has made
a useful contribution to the body of knowledge on the African Diaspora in the
New World, especially the United States. It presents an overview of the numbers
and characteristics of African immigrants in the United States. The book illustrates
the influence of culture on African immigrants in the United States. The author
conceptualizes and utilizes culture to explain how ethnicity, language, food,
family, remittances, and politics impact the day-to-day lives of African immigrants
in the United States and their home countries in Africa.

Dr. Amadu Jacky Kaba
Associate Professor of Sociology
Seton Hall University
South Orange, N.J.
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Amadu Jacky Kaba, “Explaining President Barack Obama’s First Visit to Africa (Egypt):
Three Phenomena of Africa and Africans as the Core of U.S.-Arab/Muslim Relations,”
African Renaissance 6, no. 2 (2009): 103-106.
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Barz, Gregory and Cohen, Judah M., eds. The Culture of
AIDS in Africa: Hope and Healing through Music and the
Arts. New York: Oxford, 2011, xvii + 538 pp.
There is a sizeable literature that exists on HIV/AIDS in Africa. The majority
of these works focus on the impact of the disease in Africa and the eﬀorts of
Western organizations and scholars to fight the pandemic. Very few discuss the
intervention eﬀorts and programs Africans themselves have made regarding
this disease. The Culture of AIDS in Africa addresses this dearth by exposing the
approaches Africans and non-Africans have used in the fight against HIV/AIDS.
Specifically, according to Barz and Cohen, the thirty two chapters show the “many
pathways by which music and other expressive forms gained prominence in Africa
as agents for addressing HIV and AIDS, helping individuals and communities
address the local and international conversations coursing through their lives in
the process” (5). More importantly, one learns the African meaning of HIV/AIDS
and understands the disease and its impact from an African context. The book
uses examples, descriptions, and analyses of projects conducted mostly in eastern
and southern Africa.
The book is divided into an introduction, six sections, and a conclusion.
Each section is separated from the other by an interlude, which is a short personal
essay or song. The chapters discuss the use of various media such as newspaper
cartoons, drama, puppet shows, and photography in health-intervention and
education programs. Most of the chapters focus on the use of music.
The first section consists of four essays that discuss music’s eﬀective role in
describing the devastation the disease has wrought and the hope that remains.
These chapters oﬀer not just discussions and descriptions, but actual lyrics,
personal experiences, and scripts as well. For instance, Born in Africa, one of the
first documentaries on the epidemic in Africa, is transcribed in chapter three.
The second section has three chapters. Here, one learns from authors who have
developed and carried out arts-based health intervention programs from music
to youth forums. These touching and interesting accounts give powerful and
useful insights from the perspectives of people who worked in Africa. One learns
that fighting the disease in the continent requires understanding the individual,
communal, and political perceptions that exist.
The five essays in the third section discuss the use of edutainment media in
several countries, including South Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, and Botswana. For
people interested in developing campaigns on the disease, these essays provide
great insight into multimedia approaches. In chapter 12, Eckhard Breitinger
suggests that campaigns could succeed if governments are positively involved.
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Specifically, the chapter discusses Malawi’s use of posters to fight the epidemic.
The chapter also includes photographs that show the importance of considering a
country’s unique cultural characteristics and values in creating messages. As the
author puts it, “displaying moral, ethical, and aesthetic values that are current” in
countries “oﬀer one strategy for government intervention in a multi-front battle
against a devastating and vexing pandemic” (143). The fourth section has five
essays that examine the contributions of individual artistes/creators like Ugandan
singer Vilimina Nakiranda, South African photojournalist Gideon Mendel,
Zimbabwean singer Oliver Mtukudzi, and singers and playwrights from Kenya
and Tanzania. The essays demonstrate how these performers have used culturally
unique symbols and language to reach their audiences and contribute to the
discourse.
Part five of the book examines HIV/AIDs responses from a group perspective.
Here, one learns of the contributions of performance groups, such as choirs, drama
groups, and circuses in four chapters. Leah Niederstadt’s essay, “’I’m a Rich
Man, How Can I Die?’ Circus Performance as a Means of HIV/AIDS Education
in Ethiopia,” gives a fascinating account of the activist and entertainment roles
of circuses. Though faced with a number of challenges, circuses are an important
part of Ethiopian culture. Authentically Ethiopian circuses use culturally specific
folktales, clothes, songs, and dance to highlight ethnic identity. Niederstadt
explains that Ethiopian circus performance is similar to theatrical performance.
Economic and social issues like HIV/AIDS in the 1990s made the circus a “theatre
of necessity” (325). Using a combination of skits, acrobatics, juggling, and
more, circus members perform with edutainment goals. The Circus in Ethiopia
organization also publishes a magazine that spreads information on HIV/AIDS.
The final section of the book has four essays, which are case studies using various
research approaches. Here, the authors explore diﬀerent art forms or artistes, such
as South Africa’s kwaito music and female hip-hop artistes in Uganda, and their
contributions to the fight.
Overall, this collection of essays makes an important contribution, not only to
health-intervention or cultural studies, but also to various areas in the humanities,
social sciences, and more. Readers will learn of campaigns and strategies that have
worked. For the most part, however, the authors do not take a critical view of their
work. There is little or no discussion of what was done wrong, what could have
been done better. Such information would be helpful in knowing what to avoid.
The collection also lacks a contribution on the influence or use of social media
and the internet, which have gained ground in diﬀerent parts of Africa and have
been beneficial to the fight against the pandemic. Nevertheless, the collection has
fascinating and useful information that shed light on what Africans are doing for
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Africans through the arts in the case of HIV/AIDS.

Dr. Aje-Ori Agbese
Associate Professor of Communication
The University of Texas – Pan American
Edinburg, TX.
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